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ABSTRACT 
 
Given United Kingdom (UK) carbon dioxide emissions policies that direct attention at 
the electricity segment, the focus is on the largest electricity polluter, coal, and the 
immediately pressing issue of UK coal policy.  There is also some consideration of 
overall energy systems impacts.  Coal is an abundant, yet environmentally damaging 
fossil fuel at every stage of use.  In the European Union (EU), regulation will require 
Flue Gas Desulphurization (FGD) technology on all existing coal plants by 2016, which 
represents a large capital expenditure.  In addition, the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme will likely require future carbon abatement technologies on coal plants.  
In fact, several proposed UK coal generators are currently considering uncertain 
technology solutions to carbon emissions, Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS).  
For these reasons, the future price of coal generation remains largely uncertain with a 
wide confidence band.  This thesis uses real options analysis to develop low, medium, 
and high coal and carbon prices in the year 2030 to account for future uncertainties.  
These scenarios are compared against current and proposed coal and carbon policies 
to determine investment scenario paths, which will allow for investment decision 
modifications as price and policy factors change.     
 
The major conclusion of the analysis is that when accounting for high carbon and fuel 
price uncertainties, it is cheaper to build a new supercritical plant than it is to retrofit an 
existing plant.  This is especially true for older plants and if the FGD and CCS 
technologies will be implemented in stages.  Therefore, it is a finding of this thesis that 
the UK should set stringent coal policy, and support that policy with stringent emissions 
regulations and planning processes, to send strong price signals immediately to invest 
today either in new clean coal infrastructure or, preferably, in other sustainable 
technologies rather than face a costly further delay of energy system investments.   
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) plans to reduce carbon dioxide emission levels to 60 
percent below 1990 levels by 2060 (DTI, 2006c).  It’s an ambitious goal, and one that 
the UK is not on the path to achieve without a substantial transition in energy policy to 
change the way the UK produces and consumes energy (DTI, 2006c).  It is a finding of 
this thesis that existing policies that promote incremental steps will not create this 
necessary transition.  Despite mounting concerns about Global Climate Change (GCC), 
energy security, and rising fossil-fuel prices, UK energy consumption patterns are not 
changing significantly (DTI, 2006d).  If anything, global and UK consumption will 
increase as population grows and nations develop higher living standards.  Therefore, it 
is a finding of this thesis that sustainable energy systems should be used to generate 
energy for increasing UK energy demand.  If properly implemented, sustainable energy 
will reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP while preserving or decreasing energy 
intensity per unit of GDP.   
 
An extensive literature review found numerous existing sustainable energy 
technologies that would easily compete in a carbon-constrained economy.  The UK has 
an unique opportunity to take advantage of ageing and retiring coal and nuclear power 
plants to transform the existing electricity generation system into a clean, robust, 
secure, and diverse system.  The overarching question is whether UK energy policy will 
be strategic and stringent enough to send price signals that will force the UK to make 
the required transition.  With large numbers of political and government actors involved 
in energy policy, the UK is currently operating under a politically-constrained energy 
policy (Bower, 2004).  This means policymaking will be a slow process.  In addition, 
current energy policies rely heavily on the electricity sector to reduce CO2 emissions 
(see Figure 3) (ibid).  It is a finding of this thesis that UK policy should achieve 
reductions from every energy sector, and be broad enough to include energy efficiency 
and demand response policies.   
 
Coal policy is an immediately pressing issue of UK sustainable energy policy.  
Given the UK tendency to focus emissions policies on the electricity sector, Chapter 4 
focused analysis on the largest electricity polluter:  coal.  Existing coal policies promote 
incremental steps toward cleaning up coal (JESS, 2006).  The problem with this 
approach is that incremental fixes are expensive and time consuming.  It is a finding of 
this thesis that the UK should push for stringent sustainable energy policy measures 
now.   
 
Coal is a relatively abundant, yet environmentally damaging fossil fuel at all 
stages of the life cycle.  The European Union (EU) Large Combustion Plant Directive 
(LCPD) requires desulphurization technology on all coal plants by 2016, or a ramp down 
to plant closure.  Retrofitting existing plants will require a large capital expenditure for 
the UK (ibid).  In addition, the 2005 start of the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) assigns a price to and creates a market for carbon.  Coal, a heavy 
carbon polluter, will likely incur heavy costs on the carbon market, since the market 
should promote cheaper carbon abatement technologies.  In fact, several currently 
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proposed UK coal plants are being proposed with future Carbon Capture and 
Sequestration (CCS) upgrade capability (Marshall, 2006; Milner, 2007).   
 
Due to environmental damage, EU and UK regulations, energy security issues, 
and price volatilities, the future price of coal generation remains largely uncertain with a 
large confidence band.  To account for uncertainties in design decisions, this thesis 
employs a real options analysis to define low, medium, and high coal and carbon prices 
for the year 2030.  These scenarios are compared against current and proposed coal 
and carbon policies to determine investor scenario paths.  This approach allows 
investors and regulators to remain flexible in the design of plants and policies, 
respectively, as factors change.       
 
Chapter 2 of the thesis presents an overview of carbon dioxide market failures 
and explains how stringent policies can send strong price signals for current and future 
investments.  The chapter recommends that the UK strengthen best available 
technology policies to best achievable technologies and to focus on stringent policies. 
This approach should force innovative and cheaper technology deployment.  In addition, 
the UK should consider a diverse mixture of policies to support sustainable technology 
innovation and implementation:   
 
• Subsidies—including: (1) banning fossil fuel subsidies and (2) implementing 
other favorable tax policies.  Tax policies should focus on increasing private 
R&D to advance current knowledge and decrease technology prices, as well 
as to encourage consumers to install microgeneration and energy efficient 
measures. 
 
• Direct Regulation—including performance standards, building and production 
codes, as well as agency enforced prohibitions and injunctions.  Direct 
regulation should focus on pollution prevention and end-use efficiencies.   
 
• Information Programs—increase the availability of consumer information to 
decrease information asymmetry through educational, real-time pricing, and 
smart metering programs. 
 
However, these coordinated policy packages will be difficult to create under the current 
politically-constrained energy policy sector. 
 
Chapter 3 summarizes the UK total energy and electricity use, as well as 
domestic energy systems.  The majority of CO2 emissions are from generating energy 
as well as consuming it for transport, industrial, electricity, heating, and cooking 
purposes.  After a review of major UK energy policies, it is a finding of Chapter 3 that 
the disjointed UK energy policy needs to be overseen by one agency with the strength 
to set and enforce market-wide energy policies in a carbon-constrained economy.  This 
would pull other sectors into the EU ETS, and join all energy-related departments under 
one management.  
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In addition, it is a finding of Chapter 3 that the UK’s electricity security should be 
measured according to plant margins, production diversity, and fuel and technology 
supply, rather than by the current practice of focusing primarily on plant margins.   To 
protect against volatile fossil fuel prices and to control carbon emissions, the best 
approach is to diversify supply and generation.  It is a finding of Chapter 3 that the UK 
should use domestically available fuel sources like clean coal, wind, hydro, tidal, and 
solar.   The plan should include replacing closing coal and nuclear plants with 
sustainable generation technologies, such as renewables and clean coal.  With 
upgraded, supercritical coal-burning and carbon capture technologies, the UK can 
cleanly burn domestic coal supplies.  Chapter findings show that renewables should 
play a strong role in diversification since renewable resource supplies are abundant in 
the UK and are already competitive with current electricity prices.  In addition, the UK 
should break the heavy reliance on natural gas for electricity and heat generation.  As 
was demonstrated in the winter of 2005/2006 (Figure 8), natural gas prices can 
sufficiently rise to make coal production cheaper than natural gas (JESS, 2006).  
 
Chapter 4 analyzes clean coal for the electricity generation sector using real 
options analysis techniques.  The goals are to diversify from natural gas and meet CO2 
targets.  It is a finding of this Chapter 4 that the UK coal system, with dynamic and 
uncertain future coal and carbon prices, needs a flexible, systems approach to capital 
investment decision-making.  Real options provides decision-makers with a learning tool 
for more informed strategic decisions since uncertainties are resolved in time through 
dynamic systems analysis (Mun, 2007).  Real options techniques are used to analyze 
the UK coal system using a binomial lattice process to determine future coal and carbon 
price probability distribution functions.  Next, several scenarios are compared to model 
possible power plant configurations and the generation capacity of UK coal boilers.   
 
The analysis attempts to address how the UK should dynamically manage their 
coal system, especially considering the entire energy system, and to what extent to 
modify existing DTI coal strategies.  For instance, to achieve UK CO2 reduction goals 
and to meet regulations, all coal plants must include Flue Gas Desulfurization (FGD) by 
2016 (JESS, 2006).  It is a finding of Chapter 4 that near-term conditions will likely 
require carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology installation; a technology that has 
not been fully proven yet. When modeled for high carbon and fuel prices—a likely 
scenario that considers policy and price uncertainties—it is cheaper to build a new 
supercritical plant than to retrofit an existing plant with FGD and CCS.  This is especially 
true for older plants or if the FGD and CCS are built in stages.  It is a recommendation 
of Chapter 4 that the UK should set stringent CO2 policy across all sectors to send 
immediate and strong price signals to invest in carbon abatement technology across all 
sectors now.   
 
Chapter 5 develops conclusions and ties the thesis analysis together to present a 
better way forward for the UK coal system.  The timing is right for immediate 
policymaker and investor reaction because two-thirds of existing UK coal plants have 
plans for immediate-term FGD-retrofit.  Instead, stringent UK policy would induce these 
plant owners to invest in supercritical, clean technology now in the most long-term cost-
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effective manner to achieve future energy policy goals.  It would also avoid investments 
in stand-alone FGD-retrofits, a cost-inefficient way to invest in cleaning up plant 
emissions, and should encourage these plant owners to invest in other, more 
sustainable technologies and policies, with the focus on distributed generation 
renewables and energy efficiency.  This means that UK policymakers should support 
stringent coal policy now to send strong price signals to invest immediately in new clean 
coal infrastructure and/or other renewable technologies rather than face a costly further 
delay of energy system investment.  
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CHAPTER 2:  CO2—A GLOBAL EXTERNALITY 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on Global Climate Change (GCC) externalities due to CO2 
emissions, one of the most pressing and complex policy issues affecting the well-being 
of the economy, the environment, social equity, and humankind.  Market and policy 
failures result from the lack of flexible and stringent policy mechanisms to monitor 
markets, send price signals, and balance the social costs and social benefits of carbon 
combustion.  Significantly reducing CO2 emissions will require a world-wide systematic 
approach—considering the global characteristics of pollution, technology diffusion, 
international trading markets, and global cooperation—to develop a balanced solution.  
An international approach will be required to correct the market failures that discourage 
individuals, regions, and nations to abate GHG emissions.  This international policy will 
need support from numerous international and national policies.   
 
The abatement of CO2 emissions is underrepresented in the market due to 
several factors.  Two factors stand out as strong candidates for analysis:  information 
asymmetries and externalities. Traditional economic theory recognizes an externality as 
a market failure due to unstable property rights of a public good, the atmosphere in this 
case; however, it also assumes perfect information (with no information asymmetries).  
In addition, traditional economic theory fails to identify the constant interaction between 
suppliers and consumers, which results in a static view.  On the other hand, a dynamic 
systems approach to economic theory that considers market (and political and 
institutional) failures and dynamic growth opportunities would inform policy-makers 
about ways to send strong price signals.   
2.1 Two Market Failures:  Imperfect Information and Externalities 
  
Imperfect information and externalities directly influence atmospheric carbon 
dioxide levels, and should be considered in policy-making.  Market participants are 
almost never perfectly informed due to a general lack of information, information 
asymmetries, and price signaling.  For instance, Joseph Stiglitz argues that information 
inequities are the norm, rather than the exception (Stiglitz, 2002). Information 
asymmetries also favor industrial interests, like large fossil fuel industries, through 
influence of political representatives that set legislation.  These interests push the 
environmental clean-up costs onto the public and slow the pace of technology and 
policy adoption.  They also push for things like increased drilling rights and relaxed 
automobile standards.  In fact, the US auto industry has resisted most proposed 
government requirements, while claiming auto industry economic damage due to 
inadequately developed technologies.  Ironically, the opposite became true:  as US 
automakers have resisted technical change, they continue to struggle in the global 
market, while the Japanese, European, and Korean automakers have adapted to gain 
control of the US auto market (Whiteside, 2006).   
  
 Information uncertainty is another factor that significantly affects the economic 
performance of a system.  Different types of ignorance make consumers unaware of 
green products, unable to affect green product availability, oblivious to corporate and 
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government strategies, and unable to receive signals about resource scarcity and price 
volatility.  Imperfect information results in the inability to achieve Pareto efficiency and 
leads to inadequate information levels and consumer incentives.  For instance, in the 
case of global pollution, consumers are often unaware of pollution emission quantities, 
energy use, or simple ways to adjust behavior.   
 
Second, consumption of goods and services produces externalities—costs (or 
benefits) not reflected in the market price that impact a third party with no control over 
the original market transaction.  In a competitive, uncoordinated market, goods with 
pollution externalities are consumed at inefficient levels, resulting in too much 
production and consumption (Bjornstad, 2004).  Producing and consuming most, if not 
all, goods (i.e. gasoline, heat, an appliance, clothing, food, solar cells, etc.) produces 
externalities from CO2 emissions.  In the case of CO2, only a small portion of externality 
costs are currently being paid for by manufacturers and consumers.  
 
 Imperfect information and externalities justify government policy intervention to 
allocate goods and services efficiently.  Intense information programs would increase 
the availability of consumer information, and supporting price-signaling policies would 
affect consumer and supplier behavior.  These programs and policies must be carefully 
designed to achieve first-best outcomes, and should consider the following GCC causes 
and effects of imperfect information: 
 
• Scientific evidence of GCC—consumers and politicians are ill-informed of 
uncertainties or risks associated with GCC, affecting their Willingness to Pay 
(Demand) for abatement.  This is less of a problem in the UK than in many 
other countries, like the US, China, and India. 
 
• Technology—consumers and (in some cases) suppliers are not adequately 
informed of availability of abatement related technologies, affecting their 
product choice.  
 
• Suppliers—suppliers are inadequately informed of the benefits of action (due to 
poor price signals and supplier uncertainty) versus the costs of inaction (due to 
imperfect information), and of the demand for cleaner products (affecting their 
willingness to adapt (Supply)) 
 
2.2 Existing Policy Mechanisms 
  
Several existing and proposed policies are in place to address pollution, and this 
section will touch upon effectiveness and/or efficiency factors.  One classic response 
that internalizes CO2 externalities is to tax gas, oil, and carbon to send price signals to 
users and producers.  The objective is to achieve less, and more efficient, consumption 
as well as long-term behavioral changes.  Taxes can potentially return Pareto optimality 
(Bjornstad, 2004).  On the other hand, a government (not private) R&D program to 
improve technology efficiency, quality, or performance would not send signals to users 
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or producers to change their behavior.  Government R&D would thus only achieve a 
second-best result (Bjornstad, 2004). 
 
Governments often promote energy and environmental policies through classic 
response subsidies of renewable energy production, insulation installments, energy 
efficient appliances, as well as hybrid vehicles tax and energy credits.  Subsidies can 
directly impact end-use efficiency through price signals that influence short-term, as well 
as long-term, behavior changes; and, thus achieve first-best outcomes (Bjornstad, 
2004).  On the other hand, subsidies can send inefficient information and price signals 
to consumers, achieving second-best outcomes.  For instance, auto subsidies signal the 
availability of fuel-efficient vehicles, but unlike a tax, fail to signal fuel scarcity or account 
for pollution externalities, making this a second-best solution that should be used in 
conjunction with a gasoline tax (Bjornstad, 2003).  
 
Direct regulation, including performance, building, or production standards, 
codes, prohibitions, and injunctions, may work best when pollution thresholds are close 
to zero or need strong correction, when monitoring costs are high, and in cases of 
emergencies; in other words, times when “relationships between costs, values, and 
damages change abruptly” (Bjornstad, 2004).  The weakness is that they fail to achieve 
the lowest possible abatement costs since each firm is treated identically.  For instance, 
a comparative cost analysis by Tom Tietenberg (1984) found that direct regulation 
increased costs over market-based policies by two to twenty times (Titenberg, 1984).  
However, a review of command-and-control (CAC) regulations shows mixed 
technology-forcing results, including incremental innovation in processes and products, 
diffusion of existing technology, product reformulation, product substitution, new 
process development, radical successes, and complete regulation failures.   The most 
influential aspect of direct regulation success is the internal design of the actual 
regulation, which will be further explored in the next section.   
   
 Other types of agreements have been applied to address GCC externalities.  For 
instance, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) 
programs attempt to increase technology-sharing between developed and developing 
countries and are designed to promote energy efficiency (Kemfert, 2004).  The goal of 
these mechanisms is to reduce the economic costs of emissions reduction.  Although 
they may be good first steps towards global action, they only provide second-best 
results under their current design and need further refinement.    
  
 Cooperative international climate policy actions have been attempted through the 
formulation of the Kyoto protocol.  The Kyoto protocol, although it may be a step in the 
right global policy direction, has thus far proved insufficient.  The main reason is that the 
current largest emitter, the US, has not ratified the plan.  In addition, developing 
countries that may be the largest emitters in the future, like China and India, are not 
required to reduce emissions under the agreement.  In essence, a first-best solution has 
not been developed since many big players are not involved in the agreement.  In 
addition, the Kyoto protocol does not have serious consequences if the participants do 
not meet goals.  To be effective, the Kyoto protocol needs reformulation.   
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 Cap and trade programs attempt to control pollution by setting a limit on 
emissions and giving allowances to firms which represent rights to emit specific 
amounts of pollution.  Cap and trade programs limit total emissions.  In essence, a cap 
and trade system charges buyers of additional allowances for emissions and the costs 
of achieving emissions standards remain within the trading market.  Optimal emissions 
levels are calculated to determine the appropriate number of tradable permits.  Taxes 
are another policy tool that can achieve similar reductions in emissions since polluters 
are induced to reduce emission levels.  Quantity instruments (cap and trade systems) 
and price instruments (taxes) should be more effective depending on whether costs or 
benefits, respectively, are more uncertain.  When properly designed, quantity and price 
instruments are first-best policy frameworks (Bjornstad, 2004).   
 
Systems like the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) can be well-
designed to send economic signals to industry to innovate, or improperly designed to 
result in diffusion of existing technology.  If caps are not set stringent enough, the low-
cost firms lack incentive to abate additional pollution and the regulation will fail to 
achieve a socially optimal level of pollution.  Past price falls and sluggish futures 
indicate that the ETS has set stringency standards too low.  In addition, allowance 
credits and caps need to be reduced to achieve optimal pollutant levels.   
 
Chapter 4 will evaluate existing EU and UK coal policy to determine probable 
future costs of electricity under different policy scenarios.  In addition, the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme is further explored in Section 4.3.2 to determine 
possible impacts on the coal industry. 
2.3 Forcing Technology  
  
Policy mechanisms to reduce carbon dioxide emissions are limited by design.  A 
good measure of policy success is the degree of resulting technology innovation, which 
benefits society via positive impacts to economic growth, as well as health, safety, and 
environmental well-being.  US regulators have successfully promulgated industry 
pollution standards with corresponding achievement targets (e.g. deadlines, technology 
levels, and effluent quantities) through direct regulation instruments, such as the Clean 
Air Act.  This type of regulation can be designed to “force” industry to reduce pollution 
by developing and implementing innovative technology.  For purposes of this thesis, 
technology-forcing policy is very important for the growth of sustainable technologies 
and includes regulation promoting “clean” chemical inputs, process designs and 
operations, and final products.  “Clean” is defined as natural, safe, and low risk 
chemicals and treatment of chemicals, or pollution prevention; in other words: 
sustainable technologies.  Chapter 4 further explores clean coal technologies.  
 
To understand the dynamic system created by technical innovation, the 
economic and social benefits of technology forcing can be demonstrated by the 
following figures.  Figure 1 illustrates a static economic system that only considers 
existing technology.  The supply curve, A, equals the marginal cost of pollution 
reduction, while the demand curve, B, represents the marginal social cost of pollution 
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damage.  The willingness to accept dirty air and/or to pay for clean air impacts the 
demand. This two-dimensional, static system can be used to determine a starting point 
for carbon dioxide trading prices or taxes (t*).  The system is also limited in its 
application since it is fixed.  Outside factors will change as consumer attitudes, 
technological innovations, and regulations change.  If economic analysis is done using 
these static conditions, it will fail to consider system-wide influences; therefore, a 
dynamic situation needs exploration. 
 
Figure 1 Socially Optimal Level of Pollution and Cost (Nicholas Ashford & Charles 
Caldart, 2007) 
  
On the other hand, Figure 2 represents a dynamic system.  It was developed to 
explain the MIT strong-form of the Porter Hypothesis which concludes that some 
companies will respond with innovation to create dynamic change (Ashford & Caldart, 
2007).  This would lead to lower costs and higher benefits.  Ashford and Caldart have 
termed the MIT-Porter Hypothesis, which states that neoclassical economics fails to 
recognize that different actors, or suppliers, will likely innovate (ibid).  Figure 2 includes 
one demand curve and two supply curves that represent best existing technology and 
new technology.  For the supply curves, at levels of existing technology (R0), the best 
existing technology is cheaper than new technology.  However, as less risk is permitted 
(R1) and more stringent policy is set, technology innovation can produce cheaper new 
technology supply curves (see points C and B on Figure 2).  Further, for the same cost 
as existing technology (point B), new technology (point D) can achieve even lower risk 
levels (R2).  Stringent regulation could force the static point (B) to a point on the new 
technology demand curve between point D and point C.  The system should equilibrate 
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at the crossing of the new technology supply curve and the demand for risk reduction 
benefit curve.   
 
 
 
This hypothesis finds that stringency is the most important characteristic of 
effective (i.e. “radical”) technology-forcing regulation.  For instance, stringent health-
based regulations have been more successful at forcing technology than weak 
technology standards that diffuse, and then freeze, technology development. “Best 
available” technology standards are an example of a weaker policy that likely does not 
push industry to innovate.  Often best available technology policies induce a slight shift 
in technology followed by a period of low to no industry innovation, followed by a later 
slight shift in technology (Nicholas Ashford & Charles Caldart, 2007).  On the other 
hand, best achievable standards mandating currently infeasible or not fully developed 
technologies coupled with R&D, can force technology innovation, especially when 
considering high and uncertain fuel and carbon prices.  Applying this theory, Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) technology, which has been successful at one plant in 
Norway that turns missions into liquid for storage (BBC, 2007), but has not matured 
enough for full market penetration yet, should benefit greatly from a different strategy of 
stricter best achievable technology regulation.   
 
In addition, regulators should apply stringent standards not only to new sources, 
but also to existing plants.  Differential regulations result in longer existing plant (dirty) 
lives, meaning the worst polluters operate longer than they otherwise might have.  
  Cost 
Demand 
for Risk 
Reduction 
Figure 2 Dynamic Efficiency of New Technology (Nicholas Ashford & Charles 
Caldart, 2007)  (Nicholas A Ashford & Caldart, 2007) 
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Differential regulations can also lead to barriers to entry for new sources by allowing 
existing plants to operate cheaper.      
 
Current UK regulations require Best Available Techniques Not Entailing 
Excessive Cost (BATNEEC), following the EU BATNEEC standards (UK, 1990).  There 
is some evidence that Best Available Technology may not push as hard for innovation 
as more stringent regulation (Nicholas Ashford & Charles Caldart, 2007).  It is a finding 
of this thesis that employing a more stringent best achievable technology, coupled with 
R&D would produce dynamic efficiency of new technology (Figure 2).  BAT technologies 
can promote incremental changes in technology innovation, but innovation delay from 
static market conditions can be costly. Stricter standards should stimulate cost-
competitive, sustainable technologies through innovation-forcing policies.  In fact, 
stricter standards should induce RD&D for sustainable energy technologies to 
encourage innovative CCS, new nuclear, renewable technologies, etc.   
 
To test the theory that the result of stringent regulation will be cheaper than less 
stringent best available technology regulation, Chapter 4 analyzes the CO2 emissions 
and cost of electricity (COE) impacts of the current EU and UK policies to incrementally 
ratchet down standards through the LCPD and ETS.   
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Since imperfect information and market failures eliminate Pareto efficiency, 
government policy intervention in market allocation of goods and services is justified 
(Bjornstad, 2004).  A policy-influenced market-based type of solution should be 
implemented to achieve socially optimal and cost-efficient pollution levels.  A review of 
fossil fuel consumption social costs has identified larger macroeconomic impacts from 
rising fossil fuel prices than benefits from falling oil prices due to externalities not 
considered by users and suppliers.  In other words, a benefits/costs asymmetry (Parry, 
2003).  Since a global market determines fossil fuel prices, the best methods for 
protection against price volatility are to diversify energy sources and to reduce fossil fuel 
intensity (fossil fuel use/GDP).  Reducing fossil fuel consumption would also reduce 
CO2 emissions.  The benefits/costs asymmetry enforces the principle that increasing 
efficiency and usage of sustainable energy, while cutting back on fossil fuel use, should 
be a primary approach to reducing CO2 emissions.  As developing countries like China 
and India exponentially increase energy use, it is necessary to transition to sustainable, 
precautionary energy technologies and to create demand-side accountability for levels 
of use.   
 
 A review of UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) publications found 
forward-thinking plans and solutions to several socio-economic problems facing Great 
Britain and the world, including CO2 pollution. The DTI should continue to support the 
European carbon market and to lead the world in carbon abatement policy-making.  
Now the challenge remains to develop first-best policies and market-based instruments 
that are stringent enough.  When properly designed, they send price signals that 
encourage behavior change—such as buying more efficient vehicles, conserving 
energy, installing microgeneration, conserving energy, and updating and innovating 
   19  
industry technologies.  The price signals create a positive feedback loop that will 
stimulate technical innovation and further encourage behavior change.  Many 
economists agree that a cap and trade system is more politically palatable, and may be 
more economically efficient, than a carbon tax.  Since direct regulation has proven to be 
able to achieve technology-forcing, if pollution standards are properly set to compliment 
market-based instruments, the cap should be low enough to push sustainable 
technologies and fuels.   
 
Regulation stringency, the most important regulation factor to stimulate 
technology innovation, should be set to allow industry flexibility and time for R&D to 
deploy innovative technologies.  Flexibility can be achieved through compliance 
schedules, innovation waivers, and tradable permits systems.  Currently, the UK 
consultation model provides industry and other stakeholders with a chance for input, 
which should allow for industries to begin early preparation for regulations.  However, 
regulation certainty and stability will increase industry’s motivation to accelerate efforts 
to innovate.  Finally, effective monitoring and enforcement should increase policy 
effectiveness and have positive impacts on technology forcing. 
 
At the focal point of a balanced solution should be a well-designed cap and trade 
market for carbon.  Where appropriate, direct regulation, additional price instruments, 
subsidies, and information programs should send further signals that would rationally 
encourage progressive behavior, rather than assuming rational economic behavior to 
predict actual market behavior.  Several policy recommendations are included below:   
 
• Subsidies—including: (1) banning fossil fuel subsidies and (2) implementing 
favorable tax policies.  Tax policies should focus on increasing private R&D to 
advance current knowledge and decrease technology prices, and to 
encourage microgeneration installment and energy efficient measures. 
 
• Direct Regulation—including performance standards, building and production 
codes, as well as agency enforced prohibitions and injunctions.  Direct 
regulation should focus on pollution prevention and end-use efficiencies.   
 
• Information Programs—increase the availability of consumer information to 
decrease information asymmetry through educational, real-time pricing, and 
smart metering programs. 
 
Finally, UK regulations requiring Best Available Techniques Not Entailing 
Excessive Cost (BATNEEC) should be strengthened to stimulate new technology 
innovation.  The BATNEEC standards may not be stringent enough to push dynamic 
technology innovation, instead encouraging potentially more costly static conditions.  If 
the UK implements stringent regulations and forces technology innovation, the UK 
should save money on abatement costs and become industry leaders for the resulting 
innovative technology solutions.  Chapter 3 will further explore the UK energy system 
and develop general policy conclusions and recommendations, while Chapter 4 will test 
this hypothesis against the UK coal system. 
(N. Ashford, 1993; N. A. Ashford, Ayers, & Stone, 1985; Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2002; Kemp, 2000) 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE UK ENERGY SYSTEM 
 
UK energy data shows increasing energy consumption across sectors, rising 
fossil fuel prices, and escalating price volatility.  In addition, there is a mounting reliance 
on natural gas and other fossil fuels for power generation and transport.  Depletion of 
North Sea reserves and the UK’s recent move to net importer of natural gas means 
that—in addition to carbon emissions—energy security issues have become even more 
pressing. To meet DTI targets of 20 percent renewable electricity generation by 2020, 
the UK energy system is currently being analyzed by the DTI and industry from all 
angles.  Achievement of these targets will not come easy and will likely result in a 
geographical redistribution of electricity generating capacity.  There are large wind 
resources in Scotland and in shallow locations off the coast of England and Wales (DTI, 
2003b), and microgeneration renewable would generate power at the source.  
Achievement of UK energy targets will also require investment in additional 
infrastructure to support electricity transmission, distribution, and exchange among 
generators and users (DTI, 2003b).   
 
 The Stern Review warns that strong action is required immediately to avoid the 
worst impacts of climate change (Treasury, 2007).  It concludes that delay will be more 
costly than acting now and urges strong, international policy action, including an 
international emissions trading scheme (ibid).  The Stern Review follows the aggressive 
2006 Energy Review recommitment to four main goals: 
 
1. Cut CO2 emissions by 60% by about 2050; 
 
2. Maintain reliable supplies; 
 
3. Promote competitive markets in the UK and beyond, raising rate of 
sustainable economic growth and improving productivity; and 
 
4. Ensure all homes adequately and affordably heated (DTI, 2006c). 
 
Although the analysis section focuses specifically on the coal industry, the overarching 
thesis question—whether UK energy policy will be strategic and stringent enough to 
force the UK to make a major transition required to meet Energy Review goals and to 
heed Stern Review warnings—will be further developed in this chapter.   
 
Chapter 2 examined why UK best existing technology conditions could fail to 
force technology innovation, while this chapter analyzed the UK energy sector with 
three major conclusions.  First, UK energy and carbon dioxide policy-making is made 
across numerous different agencies and departments and may be too disjointed to be 
effective as they could be.  An oversight agency with enforcement power should set and 
oversee UK-wide energy policies to implement a carbon-constrained economy.  
Second, future DTI UK electricity generation fuel mix estimations show that the UK will 
remain heavily dependent on natural gas for approximately 75 percent of electricity and 
space heating needs (DTI, 2006d).  To ensure future energy security and a diverse 
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energy system at less volatile prices, the UK should push the development of renewable 
sources, clean coal industries, and other sustainable technologies.  Third, UK policy 
seems to rely too heavily on the electricity sector to achieve CO2 emission reductions.  
While looking at all industries in the energy sector is outside the scope of analysis, 
energy strategies for the coal electricity sector will be explored in Chapter 4.   
 
Chapter 3.0 presents and sums up the UK total and domestic energy system.  
Chapter 4.0 explores clean coal for the electricity generation sector as a way to diversify 
from natural gas.  Chapter 5.0 uses qualitative and quantitative data to tie the thesis 
analysis together to present a better way forward for the UK energy system.   
3.1 Current UK Energy Policy Structure 
 
 One of the “big issues” listed by then UK Prime Minister (PM) Tony Blair, climate 
change, is “probably long-term the single most important issue that we face as a global 
community” (Maugis, 2006; PM, 2007) .  Sustainable policies consider environmental, 
economic, and equity factors, and energy policy makes up a large part of sustainable 
policy, especially in the UK.  Figure 3 conceptually illustrates England and the UK’s 
energy policy players considering the related departments that set individual policies 
related to Energy.  Although not depicted, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland also set energy 
policies.   Figure 3 shows that the PM heads the Cabinet Office PM Strategy Unit 
(PMSU), which is part of the Cabinet Office.  Both are directly involved in energy-related 
policy through the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) at the core, supported by the 
Department for Environmental, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), and the Office of Gas 
and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) (under DTI and FCO influence) (DEFRA, 2007; DTI, 
2007b; Ofgem, 2007).   
 
DTI, DEFRA, and OFGEM each play a large role in UK Energy Policy and 
together they reach across energy-related sectors.  The DTI Energy Group, headed by 
Malcolm Wicks, is charged to provide the UK with safe, secure, sustainable, and 
affordable energy (DTI, 2007).  The DTI led the 2003 and 2006 Energy Reviews with 
input from the PMSU (DTI, 2003a, 2006c).  DEFRA focuses on climate change and 
energy issues specifically related to sustainable energy and development (DEFRA, 
2007).  DEFRA allocates UK carbon trading allowances via the UK National Allocation 
Plan (NAP), which are traded on the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS).  Ofgem aims to protect UK energy customers, promote competition, and regulate 
monopolies by regulating gas and electricity markets. (Ofgem, 2007).   
 
 As detailed in Figure 3 UK energy policymaking has an expanded field of 
influence (figure expanded from (Maugis, 2006)).  Figure 3 represents several systems 
related to energy policy, and illustrates the general complexity and overlap in setting 
energy policy.  There are multiple Departments, Cabinets, Committees, and Strategic 
Units, all under the influence of the Prime Minister of England.  There are several 
connections worth noting.  For instance, the Stern Review was conducted under the PM 
by an independent committee under the request of the Chancellor of Exchequer 
(Treasury, 2007).  The Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group (JESS) is a 
collaboration of DTI, Ofgem, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and 
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National Grid (JESS, 2006).  The Energy Saving Trust is funded by the Department for 
Transport, DEFRA, and DTI with private sector support (EST, 2007; Maugis, 2006).   
 
 
Figure 3 Energy Policy Influence Mapping 
 
Since the overarching thesis question is whether UK energy policy will be 
strategic and stringent enough to force a UK transition, it is important to understand how 
UK energy policy is developed.  The previous influence mapping charts show that the 
UK has numerous political and agency actors involved in setting energy policy.  In fact, 
the UK may be facing a politically-constrained energy policy environment (Bower, 
2004).  This politically-constrained policy environment and multiple policy players may 
have led to an insufficient systems-approach to policy making. For example, current 
energy policies rely heavily on the electricity sector to reduce CO2 emissions as per 
Figure 4, from one Oxford University study (Bower, 2004).  Figure 4 illustrates the 
connection between an overly focused electricity policy and reduction of carbon 
emissions in the electricity sector.  Relying solely on the electricity generating sector 
would create inequities, and also miss major reduction opportunities in other sectors.  
This approach would not achieve regulatory goals.  The UK will need to take a systems 
view of carbon emission reductions to affect all major polluting sectors and help achieve 
UK goals of 60% reduction by 2050.  The next sections explore energy use by fuel-type 
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and sector—with an emphasis on the power generation and the domestic sector—to 
evaluate how to focus future policies. 
 
Data: Bower’s calculations and forecasts based on emissions data supplied by DEFRA 
Figure 4 UK Actual and Forecast Future Emissions of CO2 by Sector on a 
Business as Usual Basis (Bower, 2004) 
3.2 Current UK Total Electricity and Natural Gas Consumption  
 
The UK has traditionally depended on natural gas for both energy and space 
heating requirements, but since the 1990’s reliance has increased substantially.  Total 
gas and electricity power consumption is depicted by sector in Figure 5.  The figure 
uses a reverse timeline and a non-linear scale to illustrate sharp increases in energy 
consumption between 1990 and 2000 with slightly decreasing total use between 2000 
and 2005.  Since 2000, total natural gas and electric energy consumption has slightly 
decreased from around 1450 to 1430 TWh per year.  Over 75% of UK total consumption 
of electricity and natural gas for the industrial, electricity, domestic, and services sectors 
is derived from natural gas sources.     
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Figure 5 Total UK Electricity and Natural Gas Consumption (TWh) 1980 to 
2005 (DTI, 2006d) 
  
3.2.1 Natural Gas  
 
As seen in Figure 5, in 2005 UK natural gas consumption totaled 1074 TWh with 
the electricity industries using roughly 427 TWh (40%) followed closely by domestic 
demand around 382 TWh (36%).  Industry used 160 TWh (15%), and the service 
industry used the least, or 107 TWh (10%), despite the fact that the UK economy is led 
by the service industry.  Domestic gas demand is primarily for space heating and is 
dependent on winter temperatures and gas prices.  Since 2005 was a slightly warmer 
winter than 2004 and since gas prices rose sharply, there was a 3.5 percent reduction in 
domestic consumption over 2004.  (DUKES, 2005) 
 
3.2.2 Electricity  
Figure 6 shows the 2005 electricity demand by sector in more detail than Figure 
5.   In 2005, the industrial sector topped the charts using approximately 1/3 of the total 
with domestic and service sectors also accounting for approximately 1/3 of total 
electricity.  In 2005, UK electricity demand was approximately 360 TWh, with main 
supply sources approximately comprising: 123 TWh coal, 74 TWh nuclear, 1 TWh oil, 
132 TWH natural gas, 16 TWh renewable, and 14 TWh other, including imports (DTI, 
2006c).  As shown in Figure 7, the UK consumed just less than 350 TWh of electricity 
per year in 2000, and just over 350 TWh in 2005.  Between 2000 and 2005, electricity 
use follows a pattern of increasing consumption at a slightly decreasing rate from 
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previous years.  Demand is expected to slow down by 2010 and then increase between 
2010 and 2020.  
 
Figure 6 UK Electricity Demand Breakdown 
3.3 Future Electricity Trends 
 
Figure 7 presents DTI’s projections of electricity generation and its fuel mix for 
2010, 2015, and 2020.  The forecast predicts a somewhat disturbing prediction by the 
DTI for year 2020 natural gas electricity generation—that the current UK natural gas 
reliance will soon become even more reliant on natural gas imports.   With strong 
growth in natural gas electricity production during times of historically low prices, recent 
price increases have tightened the gas market leading to higher import prices (DUKES, 
2005). This fact alone creates concern; however, uses other than electricity generation 
account for approximately 60 percent of UK natural gas use (DTI, 2006d).  In addition, 
dwindling North Sea natural gas resources and the energy security issues created by 
over-reliance on fuel imports mean that the UK should reconsider future dependence.  
Another concern is that natural gas has an extremely volatile price history in addition to 
recent high prices.   
 
Discussed further in Chapter 4, many UK nuclear and coal generation plants are 
scheduled to close or retire by in the next 20 years, and plans are in place to replace 
capacity primarily with new gas, coal, and some renewable generating capacity (JESS, 
2006).  The UK government is also reconsidering its nuclear policy to determine if 
nuclear should play a bigger role in future electricity generation (DTI, 2006d).     
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Despite recent goals of 20 percent renewable generation, the DTI predicts 
roughly 14 percent of 2020 electricity demand will be met by renewables (DTI, 2006c).  
This thesis recommends a 2030 electricity mix, such as the theoretical one depicted in 
Figure 7 that builds on CO2 goals, existing generation, replacement opportunities for 
closing plants, Renewable Obligation goals, carbon and fossil fuel price uncertainty and 
volatility, diversity, and technology innovation to revitalize and rejuvenate the UK’s aging 
energy infrastructure.  This would include an electricity generation mix that achieves 30 
percent renewables; holds natural gas constant to current output; closes aged nuclear 
plants and continues operation on the remaining plants; and transitions faster to clean 
coal including flue gas scrubbing and carbon capture and storage. 
 
 
Figure 7 UK Electricity Generation Fuel Mix (2000 to 2020) (DTI, 2006c) 
 3.4 UK Energy Security 
 
The Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group (JESS), in conjunction with 
the DTI, Ofgem, National Grid, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), is 
concerned with medium- to long-term energy security (JESS, 2006).   Plant margin—the 
percent of plant capacity that exceeds peak winter demand—is used to quantify supply 
and demand security (JESS, 2006).  The UK historically achieves around or (mostly) 
above 20 percent plant margin, but JESS maintains that no margin can guarantee that 
   27  
100 percent of demand  would or even should be met (JESS, 2006).  In fact, it should 
be true that decreasing peak winter demand could decrease plant margin requirements.  
In addition, since thermodynamics dictates that electricity generation operates at 
approximately 33 percent efficiency, a simple program of increasing energy efficiency 
would save electricity and increase security.  Transmission and distribution losses, as 
well as inefficient consumption patterns, also decrease efficiency, requiring higher plant 
margins.  Measuring energy security based on plant margin does not recognize the 
ability of energy efficiency to decrease overall energy needs. 
 
In addition, since fuel prices exhibit volatility, and renewable sources exhibit 
intermittency, plant margin should not be the only measure of energy security.  For 
example, natural gas currently supplies over 75 percent of UK electricity and space 
heating needs (See Figure 5) (DTI, 2006d).  Natural gas demand is expected to fall 
slightly and then rise gradually in the next 10 years (JESS, 2006).   UK and North Sea 
supplies have been on the decline since 2000, when the UK became a net importer of 
natural gas (ibid).  By 2020, the UK is expected to import at least 80 percent of natural 
gas from diverse sources and routes, such as the Norway interconnector and planned 
upgrades, a planned second interconnector, and various existing and planned liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) import facilities (ibid).  There is also some potential for UK supplies to 
increase somewhat with high natural gas prices due to competitive extraction (ibid).  
Gas spot and forward prices are volatile, recently ranging between October 2006 lows 
of 21p per therm and January 2006 highs of 90p per therm (JESS, 2006). These factors 
could combine to undermine UK energy security in the likely event of high natural gas 
prices.  These concerns further illustrate the uncertainty in fuel prices and why a mixture 
of resources should meet energy demands. 
 
The 2006 Energy Review considers clean coal an important contributor to future 
UK energy (DTI, 2006b).  In the UK, coal extraction has fallen from 50 Mt in 1996 to 20 
Mt in 2006 (JESS, 2006).  Coal extraction and generation also face several 
environmental challenges, with cost of electricity controlled by current and forward 
prices.  Despite these facts, coal-fired generation supplied approximately one-third of 
electricity for 2006, rising to 42 percent during the winter (JESS, 2006).  In 2016, the EU 
LCPD will enforce tighter emissions levels for coal plants (Further explained in Chapter 
4).  LCPD controls are expected to decrease 2020 coal generation to approximately 60 
percent of 2005 demand (JESS, 2006).  Currently, about 70 percent of coal is imported, 
which is expected to remain constant through 2020, although later analysis finds clean 
coal technology combined with UK coal reserves to be cost-competitive in a carbon-
constrained economy.   
 
Figure 8 illustrates how coal-fired generation contributes to peak winter demand, 
while nuclear and natural gas (CCGT) plants tend to operate fairly consistently 
throughout the year.  Unless natural gas reliance is even further increased, Figure 8 
provides evidence of a future gap in the electricity sector from coal and nuclear closures 
through 2030.  Since the UK already shows strong reliance on natural gas, clean and 
sustainable generation is needed to meet emissions targets.  For instance, the UK 
should consider distributed microgeneration to meet domestic, commercial, industrial, 
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public administration, building, and loss sector demand.  Since capital investment will be 
required either way, the UK should invest in all new renewable technologies that rely on 
readily available sources like solar, wind, waste, and biomass power.  Analyzed in 
Chapter 4, the UK should also consider updating approximately 60 percent of its coal 
infrastructure to ultrasupercritical pulverized coal plants with flue gas and carbon 
capture and storage technologies, further explored in Chapter 4. The next section briefly 
analyzes the electricity market and grid. 
 
 
Figure 8 UK Generation Profile Summer/Winter (JESS, 2006) 
3.5 UK Electricity Market and Grid 
 
The April 2005 British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
(BETTA) act created a single UK wholesale electricity market to “promote competition in 
generation and supply” (DTI, 2005).   Wales’ and Scotland’s electricity markets were 
incorporated into the England National Grid Company (National Grid), the current UK 
System Operator (ibid). BETTA manages metering and settlement arrangements to 
ensure “that all parties pay, or are paid, for the power that they buy or sell” (ibid).  Under 
BETTA, National Grid charges all grid-connected generators for use of any part of the 
transmission network in the UK (Ford, 2005) and is responsible for holding short-term 
reserve for uncertain events (JESS, 2006).  An extremely liberalized UK energy market 
has amongst the cheapest domestic and industrial energy prices in the EU, and is 
driven by market participants commercial decisions (JESS, 2006).  
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Figure 9 (adapted from (DTI, 2005)) is a simplified map of the UK electricity 
system and illustrates the physical and commercial supply chains.  The commercial 
chain operates in conjunction with the supply chain to manage power payments, 
production and demand, transmission and distribution networks payments, and supplier 
metering.   The physical supply chain illustrates the movement of electricity through the 
grid.  BETTA sets the rules to balance supply and demand and “ensure that suppliers, 
traders and generators bear their fair share of the costs and the benefits (DTI, 2005).”  
National Grid matches power generation to consumer demand through Balancing 
Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges to suppliers.  It is a complex system with 
many operational elements that need to be coordinated. 
Figure 9 July 2005 UK Commercial and Physical Supply Chain  
 
The UK’s grid network contains the bulk of major transmission lines (275 and 400 
kV) in the south to accommodate population centers.  Scotland, with the most wind and 
hydro renewable resources, has a weak network of 275 kV lines connected to the 
national grid.  These lines are insufficient to carry increasing amounts of wind and hydro 
power to the southern England population centers.  To meet government renewable-
generation goals, the Scottish grid network would need further development.  A 2003 
study by the Transmissions Issues Working Group, with review by an independent 
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technical consultant to DTI, found that 2 to 6 GW of Scottish production would require 
£520 to £1495 million in grid investment (DTI, 2003b).  In addition, England’s network is 
aging and in desperate need of upgrading, which is another costly centralized electricity 
system project.  On November 6, 2006, Engineering News Record reported $5.3 billion 
(£2.7 billion) in contracts to upgrade aging transmission networks and to build links to 
increasing numbers of wind farms and new generating plants (ENR, 2006).  This 
commitment of funds indicates that the UK is serious about meeting renewable goals 
and customer needs.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine if the ability of the grid 
network to accommodate diverse generation technologies has been considered.  The 
work should be carefully analyzed to consider future sustainable generating mixes.   
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Section 3.1 explored UK energy policy and finds that the disjointed UK energy 
policy may need to be overseen by one agency with the strength to set and enforce 
market-wide energy policies in a carbon-constrained economy.  This would pull other 
sectors into the EU ETS, and join all energy-related departments under one 
management.  As noted earlier, agencies have momentum and resist change; therefore, 
it’s likely not necessary to shift employees out of their current locations.  How to unify 
UK energy policy and where to house employees should be studied further before 
making system-wide changes.  If employee morale is destroyed in the process of 
developing a unified front, the agency will be worthless.   
 
As explored in Section 3.4, the UK’s future energy security should not be 
measured exclusively by plant margins, but should include production diversity, fuel 
supply, and technology supply.   The best approach to energy security is to diversify 
supply and generation to protect against volatile fossil fuel prices and to control carbon 
emissions.  The UK should use domestically available fuel sources like clean coal, wind, 
hydro, tidal, and solar.   The plan should include replacing closing coal and nuclear 
plants with sustainable generation technologies, such as clean coal, new nuclear, and 
renewables.  The UK should not rely too heavily on natural gas for electricity and heat 
generation.  As was demonstrated in the winter of 2005/2006 (Figure 8), natural gas 
prices can sufficiently rise to make coal production cheaper in comparison. In addition, 
with upgraded, innovative coal-burning and capture technologies, the UK can cleanly 
burn domestic supplies.  Renewables should also play a strong role in diversification 
since renewable resource supplies are abundant in the UK at much cheaper prices.  
Chapter 4 explores the impact of clean coal, making recommendations on the UK future 
electricity mix. 
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CHAPTER 4.0—Future UK Clean Coal:  To Burn or Not to Burn 
 
“Simply defined, real options is a systematic approach and integrated solution using 
financial theory, economic analysis, management science, decision sciences, statistics, 
and econometric modeling in applying options theory to valuing real physical assets, as 
opposed to financial assets, in a dynamic and uncertain business environment where 
business decisions are flexible in the context of strategic capital investment decision-
making, valuing investment opportunities and project capital expenditures.” (Mun, 2007) 
   Jonathan Mun, Ph.D., Vice President, Decisioneering, Inc.  
 
 Coal, once considered the black gold of the UK, has had a checkered past 
complete with miner strikes and labor issues, numerous environmental concerns, and 
an industry transition from government subsidized to a private sector industry.  
Currently, the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) requires Flue Gas 
Desulfurization (FGD) technology by 2008 or to close down existing conventional coal 
plants by 2016 (Jess, 2006). Future carbon prices will likely push the industry to develop 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology and other technology innovations (see 
Section 2.3).  The regulatory hurdles of the Electricity Act and UK planning law will 
make new conventional coal plant construction approval unlikely (Nuttall, 2007).   In 
addition, uncertainties associated with rising coal costs, a carbon market, declining 
domestic coal extraction, and energy security make coal plant investment decisions 
more difficult.   
 
The most pressing issue for the coal industry is how to invest now (by 2008) to 
meet future environmental regulations in a cost-efficient manner, while also considering 
the dynamic and uncertain future of coal.  Therefore, the UK coal system, with dynamic 
and uncertain future coal and carbon prices, needs a flexible, systems-analysis 
approach to capital investment decision-making, especially designed for a system as 
large as the UK coal system.  Real options analysis is one method that can incorporate 
future fossil fuel and carbon price uncertainties into levelized capital cost calculations of 
power plants to determine whether to build incremental improvements or to close the 
plant.  This alternative view of business strategy is necessary due to the difficulty of 
predicting future prices in the coal, electricity, and carbon markets, as well as the 
interaction between these systems and larger systems like the international energy fuel 
system and steel industry, as well as the UK electricity and transportation systems.   
 
Coal and carbon price projections are difficult and many predictions are wrong.  
For instance, fossil fuel price trends are generally incorrect because they assume 
simplified growth paths, while market forces produce large price swings.  Both coal and 
carbon have a large confidence band of probable prices.  Real options techniques 
provide decision-makers with a learning tool to develop better informed strategic 
decisions as uncertainties are resolved through time in a dynamic system (Mun, 2007).  
In other words, the resulting real options decision tree helps business leaders and policy 
makers form and reappraise their strategies as situations change, which they are almost 
guaranteed to do.   
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Chapter 4 explores the UK coal system using a real options binomial lattice tree to 
represent future coal and carbon prices, including future low-sulfur coal, medium-sulfur 
coal, and carbon price probability distribution functions (PDFs) to account for future 
regulatory (carbon and sulfur dioxide) and coal price uncertainties.  After generating 
PDFs, carbon and coal prices were used to analyze and compare several scenarios that 
account for current and future UK plant owner investment choices in response to the 
LCPD regulation by considering the cost of FGD retrofit and new build.  The analysis 
compared UK power plant configurations to determine electricity-generating costs per 
kilowatt-hour (£/kWh) and pollutants per year (tonnes) using the Carnegie Mellon 
University Integrated Environmental Control Model (IECM).  The final step was to input 
IECM scenario outputs into spreadsheets to calculate and compare:  
 
(1) capital costs, 
(2) probable 2030 costs of coal electricity generation, and  
(3)  emissions levels of carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide.   
 
Potential power plant configurations are compared to determine coal’s optimal 
contribution to 2030 UK electricity needs.  The analysis attempts to address how the UK 
should dynamically develop their coal system and how to modify existing DTI coal 
strategies.  
 
 
Each scenario, explained in detail in Section 4.4, was based on plant retrofit and 
new plant technology options, as well as multiple 2030 coal and carbon price 
combinations.   
 
The results conclude that by the year 2030—when the total UK carbon emissions 
goal is approximately 350 million tonnes (Mt) of CO2 (95 Mt of Carbon)—coal can only 
be burned cleanly, and would likely do so at a premium price.  With carbon and coal 
prices projected to significantly increase, the price of pollution emissions brings clean 
coal technology costs in line with conventional coal.  For instance, clean coal 
technology 2030 prices vary from a low of £0.09/kWh up to £0.17/kWh for a subcritical 
plant retrofit and between £0.10/kWh and £0.16/kWh for a new supercritical plant.  The 
results of the analysis and outcomes were used to compare current and possible power 
plant configuration plans and the necessary supporting policies.   
 
The major conclusion of the analysis is that when accounting for high carbon and 
fuel price uncertainties, it is cheaper to build a new supercritical plant than to retrofit an 
existing plant with FGD and/or CCS.  This is especially true for older plants and if the 
FGD and CCS will be built in stages.  In addition, although not analyzed in this thesis, 
several technologies—renewable, microgeneration, new nuclear—are cost competitive 
now with new coal power plant’s cost of electricity.   Therefore, it is a finding of this 
thesis that the UK should review CO2 policy across all sectors to ensure strong price 
signals to induce investment in carbon abatement technologies across all energy 
sectors now.  The timing is right because several UK coal plants have plans for 
immediate-term FGD-retrofit.  Instead, stringent UK policy would induce these plant 
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owners to invest in supercritical, clean technology (with FGD and CCS) now in the most 
long-term cost-effective manner to achieve future energy policy goals.  It would also 
avoid investments in stand-alone FGD-retrofits, a cost-inefficient way to invest in 
cleaning up plant emissions, and should encourage these plant owners to invest in 
other, more sustainable technologies and policies, with a focus on distributed 
generation, renewables, and energy efficiency. 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The Energy Review reports specify that “clean coal” will have an important and 
continued roll in UK energy production (DTI, February 2003).  According to the DTI, 
clean pulverized coal includes high-efficiency boilers, co-firing with biomass, and carbon 
capture and storage (CCS), which secures carbon dioxide emissions and transfers them 
to an underground geological site (DTI, 2006a).  The CCS process has been 
demonstrated, but is not yet considered fully proven (MIT, 2007).  The DTI is committed 
to developing CCS through demonstration funding of the Carbon Abatement 
Technology program, a CCS task force, and a formal coal advisory group (DTI, 2006a).  
In addition, the LCPD has also recently tightened sulfur regulations. Chapter 4 
considers existing plant upgrades versus building new efficient supercritical boilers 
complete with built-in CCS and Flue Gas Desulfurization (FGD) technology. 
 
Compared to oil and natural gas, coal is an abundant and cheap fossil fuel, both 
in the global market and in the UK.  Currently, coal-fired electricity plays a critical role in 
UK electricity generation, supplying approximately one-third of demand, and often 
exceeding 40 percent during winter peaks (see Figure8) (JESS, December 2006).  
Coal-generation plays a strong role in UK energy supply and fuel diversity and offers 
fast response to system-wide demand since plants can be quickly fired-up.   
 
On the other hand, coal use negatively impacts the environment at each stage of 
the lifecycle from extraction, transportation, and preparation to energy production.  
Impacts include human health and safety effects, and environmental externalities from:  
mining and extracting raw materials; disposing of ash from coal conversion; SOx, NOx, 
PM, and mercury emissions during fuel cycle; and emissions of global pollutants—CO2 
during combustion, and methane from extraction (E&Y, 2005).  Despite these strong 
environmental concerns, the DTI predicts that coal will contribute approximately 15% to 
the 2020 electricity generation mix (see Figure 7) (DTI, 2006c).  Therefore, coal’s 
contribution to UK electricity generation needs further consideration. 
4.2 UK Pulverized Coal Plant Technology 
 
Pulverized coal technologies dominate worldwide coal energy production (E&Y, 
2005).  Figure 10 illustrates a typical pulverized sub-critical coal boiler plant, which 
achieves around 35% efficiency (CMU, 2006).  Cycle efficiency depends on, and is 
limited by, the temperature of the boiler steam, which is controlled by the temperature 
and pressure specifications of the boiler’s alloy materials (E&Y, 2005).  Current 
supercritical technologies are approximately 43 percent efficient (CMU, 2006).  Recent 
EU, US, and Japanese R&D programs are studying nickel alloys to bring temperatures 
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up to 700 degrees Celsius, which would increase sub-critical plant efficiencies by about 
15% (E&Y, 2005).   
 
The pulverized coal system depicted in Figure 10 is termed “flexible” because 
several modifications could be implemented to decrease plant emissions.  For instance, 
Flue Gas Desulfurization (FGD) and Carbon Capture System (CCS) retrofits would 
lengthen the plant’s life by meeting emissions regulations.  As discussed above, FGD 
technology will be required on all coal plants to meet current regulations by 2016, or 
plants will be forced to close down.  FGD uses flue gas cleaning, a costly method that 
processes large volumes of gas (E&Y, 2005).   Current pulverized coal technology also 
includes hot scrubbing to control NOx, carbon injection for mercury, and cold scrubbing 
for particulates.  Not all existing plants are fitted with these improvements. 
 
There are several available carbon capture methods such as, flue gas separation 
using chemical absorption, high-oxygen combustion, and pre-combustion capture used 
in coal gasification power plants (Howard Herzog, 2004).  Although it is costly, flue gas 
CCS is currently the cheapest capture method and uses cold scrubbing of flue gases 
with solvents to capture, transport, and store CO2 (ibid) (see Figure 11).  Amine CCS 
technology was modeled because it is employed at about a dozen plants worldwide 
(ibid) and it is the only carbon capture technology in the IECM program.  In practice, the 
captured CO2 is used for industrial and commercial processes, such as the production 
of urea, foam blowing, carbonated beverages, and dry ice production, which is why 
chemical absorption is the cheapest capture method (ibid).  However, using a life cycle 
approach means that this carbon will eventually end up in the atmosphere.  Therefore, 
this study is limited by modeling capabilities, but should still represent relative cost 
scales to help with business and policy decisions. 
   35  
Figure 11 Pulverized Coal System Components  
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Table 1 depicts the UK pulverized coal power stations as of December 2006.  
This system is continuously changing due to plant owner decisions to add FGD 
technology or to close down by 2016.  As shown in the table, most UK boiler units have 
500 MW of capacity, and most plants contain more than one, and up to six, boiler units.  
Total January 2007 pulverized coal capacity is 28.8 GW.     
 
Table 1 UK Pulverized Coal Power Stations Operating as of December 2006 
(JESS, December 2006) 
Station 
Number 
of Units 
Capacity 
(GW) 
Capacity 
per Unit 
(MW) 
Aberthaw 3 1.5 500 
Cockenzie 2 1.2 600 
Cottam 4 2 500 
Didcot A 4 1.2 300 
Drax 6 3.9 650 
Eggborough A 2 1 500 
Eggborough B 2 1 500 
Ferrybridge (Stack 1) 2 1 500 
Ferrybridge (Stack 2) 2 1 500 
Fiddler's Ferry 4 2 500 
Fifoot Point (Uksmouth) 3 0.4 133 
Ironbridge 2 1 500 
Kilroot 1 0.5 500 
Kingsnorth 4 2 500 
Longannet 4 2.3 575 
Ratciffe 4 2 500 
Rugeley 2 1 500 
Tilbury 3 1 333.3 
West Burton 4 2 500 
Total 58 28.0 480 
4.3 Introducing Uncertainties 
 
Supporters of real options analysis apply the process to develop frameworks for 
large investment decisions, since the process accounts for risks and future 
uncertainties.  This chapter uses real options methods because future coal and carbon 
prices are difficult to predict, and since many past projections of future fossil fuel prices 
have proven to be gross underestimations.  For instance, fossil fuel price trends are 
generally incorrect because they assume simplified growth paths, while market forces 
produce large price swings.  Both coal and carbon have a large confidence band of 
probable prices.  Real options techniques provide decision-makers with a learning tool 
to develop better informed strategic decisions as uncertainties are resolved through 
time in a dynamic system (Mun, 2007).  In other words, the resulting real options 
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decision tree helps business leaders and policy makers form and reappraise their 
strategies as situations change, which they are almost guaranteed to do.   
 
A binomial lattice model (further explained in Section 4.4) considers past volatility 
and standard deviation of past prices to calculate future expected prices; that is, the 
analysis specifically considers uncertainty and risk to determine what future prices might 
be.  The binomial lattice modeling result, a probability distribution function (PDF), was 
used to determine low, mean, and high price scenarios and considered the risk of high 
prices for plant configuration decision-making.  Further explained next, the range of 
potential low and medium sulfur coal prices, as well as future carbon prices, were 
determined to account for no-FGD/CCS, FGD-retrofit, CCS-retrofit, and new plant 
scenarios.   
 4.3.1 UK Coal Situation—Supply, Quality, and Prices 
 
In the 70’s, coal production was at a high, but recently only 9 working pits with 
troubled financial pasts and less than 6000 employees exist in the UK (Pym, 2004). 
Once considered black goal in the UK, most of today’s industry is owned and operated 
by the private company, UK Coal (ibid). Today’s coal industry is a trace of what it was 
before the miners’ strike in 1984, when there were 180,000 miners working at 170 pits 
(ibid).  Official strike action began in March 1984, when miners in five pits in Yorkshire 
and Scotland believed that the pit closures were not properly reviewed (Harris, 1984).  
The strike was supported by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), which meant 
miner support across the UK (ibid).  Under Conservative Government leader, Margaret 
Thatcher, the High Court seized the NUM funds in October 1984 (ibid).  In addition, a 
police force was mobilized to deal with “illegal public disturbances” related to the strike 
(ibid).  Thousands of miners lost their jobs permanently, and others were denied state 
benefits (ibid).  In the end, one year after initiating the strike, the NUM conceded defeat 
(ibid).  Figure 12 shows the devastating impact on the coal extraction industry in the UK.      
 
LCPD emission control limits eventually require FGD with a maximum of 1.8% 
sulfur, or without FGD to burn 0.18% sulfur coal (MottMacDonald, 2004). Sulfur levels in 
domestic UK coal average approximately 1.7 to 1.8% (ibid).  Due to the high costs of 
washing fines to remove sulfur, UK coal has little potential for use in non-FGD power 
plants.  The UK has the prospect to export non-compliant coal internationally, but this 
market could shrink as local sulfur regulations tighten, unless foreign plants are 
equipped with FGD technology.  On the other hand, stringent sulfur regulations would 
likely induce technology innovation for more cost-efficient sulfur control or could push 
the market to substitute a more sustainable technology (see Section 2.3).  LCPD 
regulation drives the current UK coal demand prospects:  (1) burn UK coal only in plants 
fitted with FGD technology, (2) potentially export coal on the global market, (3) an 
uncertain future coal market, and (4) an uncertain domestic and international regulatory 
environment.        
 
With future plant operating costs are heavily dependent on fuel costs, it is 
important to analyze future coal price-impacts.  In the UK, power stations account for 
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approximately 90% of coal consumption (ibid).  Coal imports accounted for over 70% of 
UK coal demand in 2005, while production of coal in the UK continues to decline (Jess, 
2006).  Since UK electricity industry privatization, the UK coal industry is increasingly 
influenced by the global coal market (ibid).    In 2004, the international market had 
delivered prices close to record levels due to high demand in 2003 (ibid).  Prices are 
expected to decline over the next decade to levels above pre-2003 prices (ibid).  
According to the DTI international imported steam coal traded around £25/tonne in 
2003, but rose strongly in 2004 and peaked at £37/tonne; between 2004 and 2005, 
prices fell back to £32/tonne (DTI, 2007a). In other words, prices received by UK 
producers for sales to generators have been in the range £26/tonne to £29/tonne over 
the period 2003-2005 (ibid). 
 
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website contains coal spot 
prices, futures, and historical trends (EIA, 2007).  Coal prices were fairly stable from 
1990 to 2002; however, prices and volatility rose significantly after 2003 influenced by: 
market, political, and institutional failures, as well as supply and demand side factors, 
including physical availability, natural disasters, transportation, political situations, 
carbon and pollution regulation, consumer willingness to pay for cleaner products, and 
availability of substitutes (ibid).  Since coal trades on a global market and since UK past 
price performance is similar to the detailed EIA data and much harder to access, US 
prices have been used to approximate UK coal prices.  In addition, the starting price of 
coal is an input in the binomial lattice tree that is simple to change to update market 
conditions as they change.  Therefore, the analysis can be changed at any time due to 
a wide fluctuation in market conditions.  EIA data, at the time of analysis and adjusted 
for current exchange rates, generated analysis of prices in the range of £20/tonne to 
£27/tonne (ibid). 
4.3.2 Emissions Regulation  
UK regulations require Best Available Techniques Not Entailing Excessive Cost 
(BATNEEC) standards.  New plant pulverized coal sulfur BAT is Flue Gas 
Desulfurization (FGD) technology.  Modeling of existing and proposed power plants, 
including the FGD technology, was based on the following UK overlapping emissions 
rules, which are the main constraints on coal burn: 
 
• National Emission Ceiling Directive (NECD) – which sets UK-wide all-
installations cap on SO2, NOx, and particulates for 2010; 
 
• Revised Large Combustions Plant Directive (LCPD) – which sets station and 
company level annual emissions caps on SO2, NOx, and particulates, 
beginning 2008;  
 
• Ambient air quality standards which set maximum levels of concentration of 
acid gases and particulates in local air (MottMacDonald, 2004), and 
 
• Potential future EU ETS market trading price and National Allocation Plan 
(NAP) permit appropriation influence of higher future carbon prices.  
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The first three regulations, enforced under the UK Pollution Prevention and 
Control (PPC) regulation, were introduced in 2000 as a result of the EU Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive.  For instance, NECD imposes 
significant caps on SO2, NOx, and particulates for 2010 and aims to limit UK coal burn 
by significantly raising the cost of producing power.  In addition, the 2005 ambient air 
quality standards will restrict most non-FGD coal units to burn very low sulfur coal, 
which requires plant upgrades to combat high combustion volatility.  Very low sulfur 
coal, imported from Indonesia, also exhibits even more volatile price characteristics than 
medium sulfur coal.  (MottMacDonald, 2004)          
 
Under the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD), a plant has three choices:  
(1) comply with the Emission Limit Value (ELV) by 2008, (2) comply with the National 
Emission Reduction Plan (NERP) 2008, or (3) opt-out (close down) by 2016.  Under 
ELV, existing plants must meet current new plant emission SOx standards of 400 
mg/NM3.  NERP caps total emissions from the coal power industry.  Both ELV and 
NERP would require FGD technology or a switch to very low sulfur coals by 2008.  If a 
plant opts out due to high retrofit costs, the plant must close by 2016, limiting operating 
hours to 20,000 hours between 2008 and 2015.  (MottMacDonald, 2004)  Table 2 
describes the current plant status regarding LCPD regulation (JESS, 2006).   Any of the 
8,200 MW that have chosen to opt-out could continue to operate for 20,000 hours to the 
end of 2015 (ibid).  The table shows that approximately 30 percent of existing coal 
capacity will be lost due to the LCPD regulation.  The next section discusses the impact 
on carbon prices from the EU ETS. 
   40  
 
Table 2 December 2006 UK Power Plant Status 
UK Pulverized Coal Power Stations Status under the Large Combustion Plant Directive 
 
Station 
Insalled 
Capacity 
(MW) 
FGD 
Opted-In 
(MW) FGD Status as of January 2007 
Aberthaw 1,500 1,500 Fit by 2008 
Cockenzie 1,200 - Opt-out 
Cottam 2,000 2,000 Fit by 2007 
Didcot A 1,200 - Opt-out 
Didcot B* 800 - Opt-out 
Drax 3,960 3,960 Complete 
Eggborough 2,000 2,000 1/2 Complete, Will fit other 1/2 
Ferrybridge  2,000 1,000 1/2 Units by 2008 
Fiddler's Ferry 2,000 2,000 Fit by 2008 
Fifoot Point 
(Uksmouth) 400 400 Complete 
Ironbridge 1,000 - Opt-out 
Kilroot 500 500 Fit by 2007 
Kingsnorth 2,000 - Opt-out 
Longannet 2,304 2,304 Fit by 2008 
Ratciffe 2,000 2,000 Complete 
Rugeley 1,000 1,000 Will fit 
Tilbury 1,000 - Opt-out 
West Burton 2,000 2,000 Fit 
Total 28,064 20,664 Opt-out 7,400 MW 
Source: Compiled from (JESS, 2006) 
4.3.3 Carbon Prices 
 Carbon prices are one of the most uncertain commodity prices on the market 
today, due to the market’s newness and price uncertainties.  Carbon dioxide, a pollutant 
that largely influences global climate change levels, is steeped in uncertainties of 
impacts of changing temperatures.  The European Union (EU) Directive 2003/98/EC 
and Amendment 2004/101/EC established the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for 
reducing carbon emissions and mitigating climate change uncertainties (EC, 2006).  
Over 10,000 energy and industrial sector emissions levels—that collectively contribute 
almost 50 percent of EU CO2 emissions—are covered under the trading scheme (ibid).  
The ETS goal is to cost-effectively comply with Kyoto Protocol commitments (ibid).   
 
One emission allowance, the trading ‘currency’ of the ETS, allows one tonne of 
CO2 emission.  Allowances are distributed according to approved Member State 
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National Allocation Plans (NAP), which establish individual installation allocation 
allowances.  These allowances can be used, traded, or banked for future use.  Based 
on the established cap (i.e. the stringency of the regulation), individual installations have 
a choice to buy allowances, upgrade technology, or switch fuels.  The ETS will soon 
enter its second phase of trading for 2008 to 2012, concurrent with Kyoto Protocol 
timelines.  The European Commission (EC) recently approved the phase two NAPs, 
although many Member State allocations are still being settled.  The third trading period 
begins in 2013, and the European Parliament and Council of Ministers are undertaking 
a consultation review of the ETS Directive.  A stakeholder working group will submit the 
main findings by June 30, 2007, which will be followed by the EC legislative proposal.  
(EC, 2006) 
 
4.3.4 Spark and Dark Spreads 
 
A study for the DTI has analyzed the impact of carbon trading on historic 
wholesale prices and to what extent the price of carbon has been passed on to the 
consumer through the wholesale price (IPA, 2005).  Specifically, the study examines the 
correlation between carbon prices and the spark and dark spreads (ibid).  The spark 
spread is used for natural gas and assumes a typical efficiency of 50% (ibid).  It is 
calculated as the price of power minus the cost of gas to generate a unit of electricity 
(ibid).  The dark spread is calculated the same for coal power, except it assumes 35% 
efficiency (ibid).  These spreads indicate the margin over the costs of fuel that remain 
for the plant operators (ibid).  Carbon can be considered as one of these margins, 
therefore, the spread can compared against carbon costs to determine the level of costs 
that are passed along (ibid).  Electricity price volatility can be directly correlated with 
electricity  and fuel prices and their corresponding volatilities (Nuttall, 2007).  In the UK, 
there has historically been a highly correlated spark spread, while the dark spread has 
been less correlated (ibid) (IPA, 2005).  This indicates that coal markets are not as 
liquid as gas, nor as volatile since coal can be stored to wait out price spikes (IPA, 
2005). 
4.4 Scope of Analysis 
 
Figure 12 depicts the real options investment strategic plan analyzed for this 
Thesis.  Each coal plant owner has to make the decision to opt-in or opt-out of LCPD.  If 
the plant owners opt-in, standards are met by installing FGD or burning very low sulfur 
coal.  If the plant owner decides to retrofit with FGD technology, the next decision is 
whether to install CCS technology to the plant.  If the plant owner decides to opt-out, 
they will have the options of just closing the plant, building a new supercritical plant, or 
investing in other electricity generating options.  If the owner decides to build a 
supercritical plant (necessarily equipped with FGD technology), the final decision is 
whether to install CCS technology.  The real options analysis in this chapter will 
consider the five resulting scenarios: 
 
1.  LCPD opt-in:  burn very low sulfur coals 
2. LCPD opt-in:  FGD retrofit, no CCS 
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3. LCPD opt-in:  FGD and CCS retrofit 
4. LCPD opt-out:  new supercritical plant, no CCS 
5. LCPD opt-out:  new supercritical plant, including CCS 
 
 
To conduct the real options analysis, the first step was to run the binomial lattice 
models to determine low, mean, and high year 2030 carbon prices, and the same for 
low and medium sulfur coal prices.  The next step was to analyze existing power plants 
based on the five scenarios to determine electricity-generating costs per kilowatt-hour 
(£/kWh).  If the plant has opted into the LCPD, the model process conservatively 
assumes paid-off initial capital investments and levelized retrofit and plant operating 
costs over a 30-year life.  If the plant opts out, a scenario is considered where electricity 
generation costs of a new supercritical plant with and without CCS incur over a 50-year 
plant life.   
4.4.1 Lattice Analyses of the Evolution of Major Uncertainties 
 
To address uncertainty and to develop probability distribution functions (PDFs) 
for low and medium sulfur coal, as well as EU ETS carbon prices, three lattice analysis 
models were built.  Binomial lattices are easy to build and understand, and are 
extremely flexible.  The same lattice model can be tweaked at any time as more 
information becomes available about volatility, mean prices, and standard deviations.  
The lattice tree can also be modified to include infinite steps, which would provide a 
Figure 12 Study Process:  Coal Power Plant Investment Strategic Plan  
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more precise answer.  On the other hand, the simplicity of the model is also its 
weakness.   
 
The lattice analysis was used to calculate the probability of price distributions 
over a 25-year time period.  Although three lattices were built and all three results will 
be presented, this section will only include the detailed process only for the carbon price 
uncertainty PDF.  Appendix A includes the detailed process for the low and medium 
sulfur coal binomial lattice distributions. 
 
4.4.1.1 Calibrate the Lattice 
 
The historical prices for carbon, Figure 13, are based on two years of EU ETS 
trading, as well as available future prices to date; therefore, volatility (v) and standard 
deviation (!) values were calculated from limited historical data Phase I data, in addition 
to an uncertain future Phase II ETS allowances.  This means that as more trading 
experience occurs, the binomial lattice should be updated to consider updated volatility 
and standard deviation calculations.  The standard deviation and mean calculations 
were, respectively, ("6.97 (£4.70) and "17.32 (£11.60)) (Figure 13).  Futures prices 
were also included to improve the accuracy of the calculation.  The results show high 
volatility (v) of 12.4 percent per year, which is equivalent to the average growth rate, 
also referred to as the interest rate.   
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4.4.1.2 Develop the Lattice Model for Carbon Dioxide 
 
 
Figure 13 Futures between December 06 and April 08 and Carbon Prices between 
January 2005 and January 2007 Data source:  Carbon Positive and ECX  
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4.4.1.2 Calibrate the Lattice 
 
The lattice model, calculated using a spreadsheet model, begins with the initial 
price, equal to January 2007 carbon prices of approximately £4.55 per tonne.  It is 
developed for the 25 one-year time periods using the following equations: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where, for January 2007 carbon conditions,  
 
(1) up = 1.330 = u 
(2) down = 0.752 = d 
(3) probability = 0.717 = p 
, 
where, #t = 1 year, v = 12.4 percent, and ! = 28.5 percent. 
 
Appendix A illustrates the application of the probability factor, p, and the up and 
down coefficients to determine the probability of each node occurring.  The lattice steps, 
expanded over a 25-year period, determined the price of carbon accounting for 
uncertainty.  The Appendix A figures depict the price variations for the 25-year period 
for selected steps of the process.  Table 3 shows the lattice analysis results for low 
sulfur coal, medium sulfur coal, and carbon dioxide prices. 
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Table 3 Year 2030 Price Probability Distribution Functions (PDFs) 
Low Sulfur Coal 
Medium Sulfur 
Coal Carbon Dioxide 
Price 
Prob-
ability Price 
Prob-
ability Price 
Prob-
ability 
 £ 489.76  0.00  £ 316.98  0.00  £3,194.64  0.000 
 £ 380.76  0.00  £ 249.34  0.00  £1,806.65  0.004 
 £ 296.03  0.01  £ 196.14  0.00  £1,021.71  0.019 
 £ 230.14  0.03  £ 154.29  0.01  £   577.80  0.052 
 £ 178.93  0.06  £ 121.37  0.02  £   326.76  0.102 
 £ 139.11  0.11  £   95.47  0.04  £   184.79  0.153 
 £ 108.15  0.16  £   75.10  0.08  £   104.50  0.181 
 £   84.08  0.18  £   59.08  0.12  £     59.10  0.174 
 £   65.37  0.16  £   46.47  0.16  £     33.42  0.137 
 £   50.82  0.13  £   36.56  0.17  £     18.90  0.090 
 £   39.51  0.08  £   28.76  0.15  £     10.69  0.050 
 £   30.72  0.05  £   22.62  0.11  £      6.04  0.023 
 £   23.88  0.02  £   17.79  0.07  £      3.42  0.009 
 £   18.57  0.01  £   14.00  0.04  £      1.93  0.003 
 £   14.43  0.00  £   11.01  0.02  £      1.09  0.001 
 £   11.22  0.00  £    8.66  0.01  £      0.62  0.000 
 £    8.72  0.00  £    6.81  0.00  £      0.35  0.000 
 £    6.78  0.00  £    5.36  0.00  £      0.20  0.000 
 £    5.27  0.00  £    4.22  0.00  £      0.11  0.000 
 £    4.10  0.00  £    3.32  0.00  £      0.06  0.000 
 £    3.19  0.00  £    2.61  0.00  £      0.04  0.000 
 £    2.48  0.00  £    2.05  0.00  £      0.02  0.000 
 £    1.93  0.00  £    1.61  0.00  £      0.01  0.000 
 £    1.50  0.00  £    1.27  0.00  £      0.01  0.000 
 
 
 
The following probability distribution function, Figure 14, graphically illustrates the 
potential costs of carbon dioxide per tonne and associated probabilities at years 5, 10, 
15, 20, 23 (2030), and 25.   
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Since the price of carbon dioxide is volatile, it is likely that the prices will vary 
considerably from year to year with a general uptrend.  The PDFs depicted in Figure 14 
and the moving mean price from Figure 15 confirm expectations that carbon prices will 
increase over time with wider spreads of prices and probabilities.  Year 23 low, mean, 
and high prices (Table 4) were used as model inputs for the next step of analysis. 
 
Table 4 Carbon Dioxide Prices for Selected Years  
 Year 0 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 23  (Year 2030) Year 25 
Std Dev  £      1.30   £    2.80   £    6.04   £     13.03   £     28.14   £     44.65   £        60.75  
Min  £      0.66   £    1.42   £    3.07   £       6.63   £     14.32   £     22.72   £        30.91  
Mean  £      4.55   £    9.81   £  21.19   £     45.74   £     98.73   £   156.67   £       213.15  
Max  £      8.43   £   18.20   £  39.30   £     84.84   £   183.15   £   290.63   £       395.39  
 For Use in the IECM model  $     48.16  Min 
   $   332.12  Mean Exchange 
Rate 1.92308  
Tonne  
Rate      1.102312      $   616.08  Max 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 PDFs for Price of Carbon 
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4.4.1.3 The Lattice Results for Low and Medium Sulfur Coal 
 
The price of coal is also volatile; therefore, similar outcomes of price distributions 
were expected.  The PDFs depicted in Figure 16 thorough Figure 18 confirm that coal 
prices will increase over time with wider spreads of prices and probabilities.  Year 23 
low, mean, and high prices ( 
Table 5) were used as basic IECM inputs.  The same process was used for both 
low and medium sulfur coal to derive the following graphs. 
 
Table 5 Low and Medium Sulfur Coal Prices 
Year 2030 Price  
(£/tonne or $/ton) 
Year 2030 Price  
(£/tonne or $/ton) 
(used as IECM inputs)  
Medium 
Sulfur Coal 
Low Sulfur 
Coal 
Medium 
Sulfur Coal 
Low Sulfur 
Coal 
Minimum £     27.69 £     56.60 $     58.69 $     120.00 
Mean £     43.26 £     90.95 $     91.70 $     192.80 
Maximum £     58.83 £     125.29 $   124.72 $   265.59 
Figure 15 Carbon Dioxide 25 Years of Mean Prices 
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Figure 16 PDFs for Price of Low Sulfur Carbon 
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Figure 19 PDFs for Price of Medium Sulfur Carbon 
Figure 18 Medium Sulfur Coal 25 Years of Mean Prices 
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4.5 Cost of Electricity for Five Scenarios 
 
After determining coal and carbon low, mean, and maximum prices, the next step 
is to analyze existing UK power plants based on the five scenarios to determine 
electricity-generating costs per kilowatt-hour (£/kWh).  The Carnegie Mellon University 
Integrated Environmental Control Model (IECM) was used to analyze typical pulverized 
coal plants and to calculate performance and costs.   
4.5.1 IECM Interface 
 
The IECM interface was applied to quickly develop and compare scenarios.  It is 
not meant to calculate exact costs that would be incurred by each individual plant; 
actual costs will vary somewhat based on individual plant characteristics.  One of the 
ICEM functions is modeling coal-fired power plants to determine the financial and 
operating impacts of implementing post-combustion CO2 Amine CCS.  The model also 
allows for numerous retrofit technologies for SOx, NOx, and particulate control (see 
Error! Reference source not found.), which can be used for all five scenarios 
described below.   
 
Plant level investment decisions in plant configuration, including FGD and CCS 
retrofit, are considered small because they are levelized throughout the life of the 
component.  This means payback assessments are limited because they fail to consider 
market volatility. Therefore, the analysis considered volatility through low, median, and 
high coal and carbon prices, and applied a conservative discount rate due to the 
complexity of each project.  In addition, experience shows that construction capital costs 
are largely uncertain and frequently grossly underestimated.  The model defaults are 
constant 2005 dollars with zero inflation and a discount rate of 10.3 percent.  This rate is 
in-line with other UK power plant cost estimations (MottMacDonald, 2004). Volatility and 
interest (inflation) have been accounted for in the real options price calculations of coal 
and carbon.   
   
4.5.2 Scenario Modeling 
 
The five scenarios, described in  
Table 6, were analyzed using the IECM interface for low, mean, and high year 
2030 coal and carbon dioxide prices.  Since Scenario 1 assumes no FGD-retrofit, the 
low sulfur coal PDF was used, while the other four scenarios used the medium sulfur 
coal PDF.  All plants were modeled with existing cold-side ESP for particulate control, 
necessary to meet current particulate matter standards.  If the plant has opted into the 
LCPD, to be conservative, the model assumed that the capital investment costs have 
already been paid-off and only summed levelized retrofit and plant operating costs over 
a 30-year life.  If the plant opts out, as in Scenarios 4 and 5, new supercritical 50-year 
plants, sized 500, 800, and 1000 MW, with and without CCS, were modeled to 
understand the performance differences between the current UK new plant proposals.   
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Table 6 Scenario Plant Input Characteristics 
 
 
The IECM interface returns various plant, fuel, plant component, pollutant, and 
financial results.  Each IECM model run was entered into spreadsheets to analyze the 
economic, environmental, and performance considerations of each plant configuration 
scenario. Example IECM model input and output screens are shown in Appendix B, 
while example spreadsheet calculations are shown in Appendix C.  The spreadsheets 
enabled calculation of the cost of electricity (COE) per kWh, graphing and comparing 
results, and further analysis of similarities and differences between the scenarios.  
Specific model outputs used in the calculations include:  capital and revenue required 
for the base plant, plant technology components, emissions taxes, fixed and variable 
operating and maintenance (O&M), major flue gas components, annual power 
generation, plant efficiency, and net electrical output.  The model outputs were 
converted to annual levelized and total O&M costs per kWh to determine total cost of 
electricity generation. 
 
4.5.3 Modeling Results 
 
 To derive the following modeling results, Appendix C tables illustrate the 
transition of IECM iteration outputs into UK coal station inputs.  A random iteration of 
Scenario 4, using low coal and mean carbon dioxide prices, demonstrates the process.  
Table 7 depicts the overall coal plant modeling results for all five scenarios for 2030 
mean coal and carbon prices.  It shows the plant parameters, including net output, heat 
rate, annual power generation, and plant efficiency.  A general and expected pattern 
 Description 
 
NOx Control SO2 
Control 
Mercury CO2 
CCS 
Boiler 
Type/ 
Efficiency 
Scenario 1 No FGD 
No CCS 
Low Sulfur 
 
None None None None Sub-critical 
36% 
Scenario 2 FGD 
No CCS 
Med Sulfur 
In-furnace 
controls 
Hot-side 
SCR 
Wet FGD Carbon 
Injection 
None Sub-critical 
35% 
Scenario 3 FGD 
CCS 
Med Sulfur 
In-furnace 
controls 
Hot-side 
SCR 
Wet FGD Carbon 
Injection 
Amine 
System 
Sub-critical 
26% 
 
 
Scenario 4 
(500, 800, 
1000 MW) 
New Plant 
 
FGD/ No CCS 
Med Sulfur 
In-furnace 
controls 
Hot-side 
SCR 
Wet FGD Carbon 
Injection 
None Super-
critical 
43% 
Scenario 5 
(500, 800 
 1000 MW) 
New Plant 
FGD/CCS 
Med Sulfur 
In-furnace 
controls 
Hot-side 
SCR 
Wet FGD Carbon 
Injection 
Amine 
System 
Super-
critical 
34% 
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emerged that plant efficiency decreases with increased retrofits on an existing plant or 
with pollution technology on a new plant due to operating energy requirements.  FGD 
technology decreases plant efficiency by less than one percent, but CCS decreases 
efficiency by approximately 10 percent.  The IECM iterations also find that FGD 
installation reduces SO2 by 99.95 percent and SO3 (sulfuric acid) by 99.5 percent in 
existing and new plants, and that CCS reduces CO2 by almost 90 percent.  The results 
also indicate that without CCS technology, one existing 500 MW plant emits over 2.6 
MtCO2 per year, while one new supercritical plant emits over 2.2 MtCO2 per year.   
  
Figure 20 graphs the 2030 CO2 and SO2 emissions/MW results from Table 7.  
The left-hand axis represents carbon dioxide emissions, while the right-hand axis 
represents sulfur dioxide emissions, with both variables following the same general 
pattern for each scenario.  For instance, Scenarios 3 and 5, with CCS, fall in the bottom 
left quadrant of the graph, exhibiting both low electricity costs and low emissions rates.  
On the opposite upper right quadrant, Scenarios 1, 2, and 4, without CCS exhibit both 
high electricity costs and high emissions rates.        
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 4 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 5 Scenario 5
Retrofit 
No FGD
No CCS
Low Sulfur
Retrofit
FGD
No CCS
Med Sulfur
Retrofit
FGD
CCS
Med Sulfur
New 500 MW 
Supercritical
FGD
No CCS
Med Sulfur
New 800 MW 
Supercritical
FGD
No CCS
Med Sulfur
New 1000 MW 
Supercritical
FGD
No CCS
Med Sulfur
500 MW
Supercritcal
FGD
CCS
Med Sulfur
800 MW
Supercritcal
FGD
CCS
Med Sulfur
New 1000 MW
Supercritcal
FGD
CCS
Med Sulfur
Plant Parameters
  Net Electrical Output 469.7 457.7 333.1 459.8 736.3 920.6 357.7 572.9 716.3
  Net Plant Heat Rate, HHV (Btu/kWh) 9,381         9,655          13,270            7876 7869 7867 10,130            10,110            10,110               
  Annual Operating Hours 6,575         6,575          6,575              6575 6575 6575 6575 6575 6575
  Annual Power Generation (BkWh/yr) 3.088 3.009 2.19 3.023 4.841 6.053 2.352 3.766 4.71
  Net Plant Efficiency, HHV (%) 36.4% 35.3% 25.7% 43.3% 43.4% 43.37% 33.7% 33.7% 33.8%
Plant Energy Requirements 30.34 42.29 166.92 40.17 63.71 20.89 142.33 227.14 283.70
  Gross Electrical Output (MW) 500 500 500 500 800 58.5 500 800 1000
  Boiler Use (MW) 29.25 29.25 29.25 29.25 46.80 0.05 29.25 46.80 58.50
  In-furnace NOx Use (MW) 0 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 4.326 0.050 0.050 0.05
  Hot-Side SCR Use (MW) 0 2.63 2.63 2.16 3.46 0.9125 2.16 3.46 4.33
  Cold-Side ESP Use (MW) 1.09 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 15.51 0.91 0.91 0.91
  Wet FGD Use (MW) 0 9.40 13.92 7.75 12.41 0.09508 11.46 18.34 22.92
  Activated Carbon Inj. Use (MW) 0.000 0.058 0.058 0.048 0.076 0 0.048 0.076 0.10
  Amine Scrubber Use (MW) 0 0.00 120.10 0 0 0 98.45 157.50 196.90
Major Flue Gas Components (tonnes/yr)
  N itrogen (N2) 10,140,056 10,474,081 10,474,083     8,583,259       13,730,828     17,166,518        8,583,260       13,730,831     17,166,521        
  Oxygen (O2) 867,273 889,939      888,746          729,488          1,167,299       1,458,975          728,295          1,164,914       1,456,589          
  Water Vapor (H2O) 710,997 1,594,971   1,594,971       1,306,874       2,094,220       2,620,310          1,306,874       2,094,220       2,620,310          
  Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 2,641,186 2,711,570   271,634          2,222,462       3,555,581       4,443,730          222,664          356,155          445,208             
  Carbon Monoxide (CO) -             -              -                  -                  -                  -                     -                  -                  -                     
  Hydrochloric Acid (HCl) 724 61.32          3.07                50.26              80                   101                    2.51                4.02 5                        
  Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) 12,425 7,867          4.07                6,448              10,313            12,890               3.33                5.33 7                        
  Sulfuric Acid (equivalent SO3) 46.97         131             0.66                108                 174                 220                    0.54 0.87 1                        
  N itric Oxide (NO) 6,537 983             983                 806                 1,414              1,871                 806 1414 1,871                 
  N itrogen Dioxide (NO2) 527 79.33          59.49              65.02              114                 151                    48.76              85.53 113                    
  Ammonia (NH3) 0.00 15.04          886                 12.33              20                   25                      727 1,166              1,461                 
  Argon (Ar) 172,739 178,346      178,346          146,196          233,877          292,332             146,196          233,877          292,332             
Total Major Flue Gas Components (tonnes/yr) 14,552,510 15858045 13,408,735     12,997,166     20,793,079     25,994,331        10,987,050     17,584,053     21,986,030        
2030 Cost of Electricity ( ! /kWh) 0.368£       0.373£        0.130£            0.336£            0.332£            0.330£               0.130£            0.124£            0.121£               
2030 Carbon Dioxide Emissions (tonne/MWh) 855.31 901.15 124.03 735.18 734.47 734.14 94.67 94.57 94.52
2030 SO2 Emissions (tonne/MWh) 4.023 2.615 0.002 2.133 2.130 2.129 0.001 0.001 0.001
2030 Coal Plant Modeling Results and Calculations (All plants are assumed to operate for 6,575 hours/year)
 
Table 7 2030 Coal Plant Modeling Results and Calculations 
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Figure X  
Figure 20 Relative Emissions and COE of the five Scenarios 
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Figure 21 and Figure 22 contain electricity-generating cost versus carbon dioxide 
price and electricity-generating cost versus coal price.  They represent several of the 
analysis modeling iterations.  In the UK, 500 MW is the most popular plant size, and 
was chosen to illustrate graphically the differences in Scenario outcomes.  Figure 21 
shows 2030 electricity-generating costs using mean low and medium sulfur coal prices, 
and varying low, mean, and high carbon prices.  Figure 22 shows 2030 electricity-
generating costs using mean carbon prices versus low, mean, and high coal prices.  
The numeric results are also summarized in Table 8.  
 
 
Table 8 Electricity Generating Price by Carbon and Coal Prices 
2030 Carbon Price 
(£/tonne) 
Low  Mean High 
500 MW Plant 
Electricity Cost (£/kWh) 
 £   22.72  
 £  
156.67  
 £  
290.63  
Low  £   56.60  £     0.08  
 £      
0.09  
 £      
0.10  
Mean £   90.95  £     0.36  
 £      
0.37  
 £      
0.38  Scenario 1 
Low Sulfur Price  
(£/tonne) 
Retrofit 
No FGD 
No CCS 
High 
£  
125.29  £     0.65  
 £      
0.65  
 £      
0.66  
Low  £   27.69 
 £      
0.07  
 £      
0.37  
 £      
0.66  
Mean £   43.26 
 £      
0.08  
 £      
0.37 
 £      
0.67  Scenario 2 
Retrofit 
FGD 
No CCS 
High £   58.83 
 £      
0.09  
 £      
0.38  
 £      
0.67  
Low  
£    
27.69 
 £      
0.08  
 £      
0.12  
 £      
0.16  
Mean £   43.26 
 £      
0.09  
 £      
0.13  
 £      
0.17  Scenario 3 
Retrofit 
FGD + 
CCS 
High £   58.83 
 £      
0.10  
 £      
0.14  
 £      
0.18  
Low  £   27.69  
 £      
0.33    
Mean £   43.26 
 £      
0.10  
 £      
0.34  
 £      
0.58  Scenario 4 
New 
FGD 
No CCS 
High £   58.83  
 £      
0.35   
Low  £   27.69  
 £      
0.12    
Mean £   43.26 
 £      
0.10  
 £      
0.13  
 £      
0.16  Scenario 5 
Medium Sulfur 
Price  
(£/tonne) 
New 
FGD + 
CCS 
High £   58.83  
 £      
0.14   
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Figure 21 Coal Price Uncertainty Effect on COE (Mean Carbon Price) 
 
 
Figure 22 Carbon Price Uncertainty Effect on COE (Mean Coal Price) 
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 Figure 21 and Figure 22 were analyzed to determine how scenarios react to coal 
and carbon price uncertainties (low, mean, and high prices).  For purposes of 
distinguishing between scenario sensitivities, electricity-generation costs are 
categorized as follows: 
 
 >  £0.45/kWh = very high  
 £0.30/kWh to £0.45/kWh = high 
 £0.15/kWh to £0.30/kWh = medium 
 < £0.15/kWh = low 
 
Table 9 compiles the price sensitivity and pollution results for a typical 500 MW 
plant.  Scenarios 2, and 4 (no CCS) show very high sensitivity to carbon prices; 
Scenario 1 (low sulfur coal) has high costs under all carbon prices; and Scenarios 3 and 
5 (CCS) show low to medium cost sensitivity with costs at low to just at medium 
electricity-generation costs.  Scenario 1 (low sulfur coal) shows high sensitivity to coal 
price with low to very high electricity-generation costs; Scenarios 2 and 4 (no CCS) 
have high costs across all medium sulfur coal prices; and Scenarios 3 and 5 (CCS) 
have low electricity generation costs across all medium sulfur coal prices.      
        
Table 9 Scenario Price Sensitivity and Pollution per Year Characteristics 
    
Electricity Generation Cost 
Sensitivity Pollution/Year 
Scenario Description Carbon Price Coal Price Mtonne CO2 
Tonne 
SO2 
Comment 
1 Low Sulfur, No Retrofit 
High cost all 
scenarios, low 
sensitivity 
High sensitivity, 
low to high cost 2.64 12.4 
Likely does not meet 
regulations.  Needs even 
less sulfur in coal = very low 
sulfur coal (from Indonesia). 
2 FGD Retrofit 
Very high 
sensitivity, low to 
very high cost 
High cost all 
scenarios 2.71 7.87 
Meets 2008 regulation.  
Likely will not meet future 
regulations. 
3 FGD/CCS Retrofit 
Medium 
sensitivity, low to 
medium cost 
Low cost all 
scenarios 0.27 4.07 
Exceeds 2008 regulation.  
Should meet future 
regulations. 
4 
FGD 
New 
Supercritical 
Very high 
sensitivity, low to 
very high cost 
High cost all 
scenarios 2.22 6.45 
Meets 2008 regulation.  
Likely will not meet future 
regulations. 
5 
FGD/CCS 
New 
Supercritical 
Medium 
sensitivity, low to 
medium cost 
Low cost all 
scenarios 0.22 3.33 
Exceeds 2008 regulation.  
Should meet future 
regulations. 
 
 The scenario results show that, in current times of relatively low coal and carbon 
prices, plants can be run economically without CCS.  However, without CCS and when 
2030 coal and carbon prices are modeled, electricity-generating costs either become 
very volatile or are simply high.  In addition, retrofitting existing plants (even assuming 
the original capital costs are paid off) is almost as expensive to generate electricity (and 
in high price scenarios slightly more expensive) than a new plant.  This indicates that 
power plant owners should carefully consider whether FGD retrofit is cost effective for 
their plant.           
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 The scenario results were applied to the UK power plant system with results 
shown in Table 10 and Table 11.  Table 10 compares existing power plants in the year 
2030 for FGD retrofit (to meet LCPD standards) and FGD/CCS retrofit scenarios.  The 
purpose of the analysis was to determine mean price scenario 2030 estimates of cost of 
electricity (COE) and emissions levels.  As of January 2007, 8,180 MW have opted out 
and plan to close by 2016, while the other 20,684 MW have opted in and have either: 
(1) retrofit with FGD, or (2) plan to retrofit with FGD (JESS, 2006).  Table 12 provides 
the DTI CO2 emissions assumptions for several plant types.  This table was included or 
a check on IECM program outputs for pollution. 
 
Table 10 includes the existing plant retrofit scenarios’ total capital costs that 
ranged from £1,514 (compared to industry estimates of about £950) for Scenarios 2 and 
4 (FGD-only) to £4,358 for Scenarios 3 and 5 (FGD/CCS).  The average COE of £0.383 
for Scenarios 2 and 4 (FGD-only) is 2.7 times higher than the Scenario 3 and 5 (FGD 
and CCS) average COE of £0.141—even considering new plants in Scenario 5. For 
comparison of data in Tables 10 and 12, UK 2030 carbon dioxide emissions goals are 
330 MtCO2 per year.  In Scenarios 2 and 4 (FGD-only) the UK coal power plant system 
would emit over 35% of that goal, while Scenarios 3 and 5 would emit less than 4%.   
 
 Table 11 includes the new plant system total capital costs which range from 
£2,904 (compared to industry estimates of about £2,180) for Scenarios 2 and 4 (FGD-
only) to £8,092 for Scenarios 3 and 5 (FGD/CCS). With the new plants, the average 
COE of £0.374 for Scenarios 2 and 4 (FGD-only) is 2.65 times higher than the Scenario 
3 and 5 (FGD and CCS) average COE of £0.141.  For comparison of emissions data in 
Table 11 and 12, in Scenarios 2 and 4 (FGD-only), the UK coal power plant system 
would emit almost 40% of the UK CO2 goal, while Scenarios 3 and 5 would emit around 
4%.   
 
 It is important to note that industry cost estimates are significantly lower than 
IECM model outputs in both existing and proposed plant configurations.  Some of this 
difference may be due to conversion between dollars and pounds in the analysis (using 
January 2007 conversions of $1 = !0.52).  In addition, the source data should be 
updated to reflect current and future prices.  Despite these limitations, plant owners 
should carefully consider retrofit and new plant costs when developing investment 
strategies.  A real options approach will provide flexibility as well as an eye to what the 
future could be.  The same analysis can be applied to other sustainable energy 
technologies to compare risks and possible outcomes.  Specifically, some plant owners 
that have opted-in and plan to FGD-retrofit the plant, especially with the likely possibility 
of later retrofitting with CCS technology, would incur more costs than the current 
industry estimates indicate.  All plant owners should reconsider investments and apply a 
strategy of investment decision-making that considers dynamic conditions and systems 
analysis. 
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Aberthaw 1,500 3 500 1500 Fit by 2008  £     0.373          8,134,711          23,602  £        197  £         153  £      0.130         814,903 12.20  £        317 
Cottam 2,000 4 500 2000 Fit by 2007  £     0.373        10,846,281          31,470  £        263  £      0.130      1,086,537 16.27  £        423 
Drax 3,960 6 660 3960 Fit  £     0.405        21,476,638          62,343  N/A  £      0.160      2,151,601          32.26  £        564 
Eggborough 2,000 4 500 2000 1/2 Units fit  £     0.373        10,846,281          31,470  £        132  £         100  £      0.130      1,086,537 16.27  £        423 
Ferrybridge 2,000 4 500 1,000 1/2 Units 2008  £     0.373        10,846,281          31,470  £        132  £         113  £      0.130      1,086,537 16.27  £        423 
Fiddlers 2,000 4 500 2000 Fit by 2008  £     0.373        10,846,281          31,470  £        263  £         113  £      0.130      1,086,537 16.27  £        423 
Kilroot 500 1 500 520 Fit by 2007  £     0.373          2,711,570            7,867  £          66  £           35  £      0.130         271,634 4.07  £        106 
Longannet 2,304 4 576 2304 Fit by 2008  £     0.406        12,473,461          36,194  £        330  £         170  £      0.163      1,249,732 18.74  £        514 
Ratcliffe 2,000 4 500 2000 Fit  £     0.373        10,846,281          31,470  N/A  £      0.130      1,086,537 16.27  £        423 
Rugeley 1,000 2 500 1000 Will fit  £     0.373          5,423,140          15,735  £        132  £         100  £      0.130         543,268 8.14  £        212 
Uskmouth 400 3 133.33 400 Fit 0.429£      2,165,200                    6,284  N/A  £      0.202         216,878            3.25  £        106 
West Burton 2,000 4 500 2000 Fit  £     0.373        10,846,281          31,470  N/A  £      0.130      1,086,537 16.27  £        423 
Cockenzie 1,200 2 600 0 Opt-out N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Didcot 2,000 6 333.33 0 Opt-out N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ironbridge 1,000 2 500 0 Opt-out N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A N/A
Kingsnorth 2,000 4 500 0 Opt-out N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A N/A
Tilbury 1,000 3 333.33 0 Opt-out N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Total 28,864 60 20,684  £     0.383      117,462,405        340,847  £     1,514  £         783  £      0.141    11,767,238             176  £     4,358 
Source: Average Total Total Average Total Total
All IECM results and supporting calculations are for 2030 mean coal and mean carbon prices as determined by the lattice analysis.
UK Coal Existing Stations and Future FGD and/or CCS Retrofit Costs
FGD Retrofit only FGD and CCS RetrofitStatus as of January 2007
Opt-out 8180 
MW   
 
Table 10 UK Existing Power Plant Year 2030 COE and Emissions (Jess, 2006) 
FGD-retrofit and FGD/CCS-retrofit Scenarios 
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Ferrybridge (New) 500 1 500 500 FGD w/ CCS?  £     0.336          2,222,462            6,448  £        359  £         250  £      0.130         222,664            3.33  £        453  £        350 
Killingholme/Humbersid
e (New) 450 1 450 450 FGD & CCS  £      0.149         220,278            3.30 434£         1,000£     
Kingsnorth (new) 1,600 2 800 1,600 FGD w/ CCS?  £     0.332          7,111,161          20,626  £     1,031  £      1,000  £      0.124         712,309   20,626.07  £     1,317 
Hatfield (New) 900 1 900 900 FGD & CCS  £      0.139         440,436            6.60 748£         800£        
Tilbury (New) 1,000 1 1000 1,000 FGD & CCS  £      0.121         445,208            6.67  £        782  £        800 
Total Existing + New 4,450 0.374£      126,796,028     367,921      2,904£      2,033£      0.141£      13,808,134  20,822      8,092£      
Total New Only Total Average Total Total Average Total Total 3,735£      2,950£     
All IECM results and supporting calculations are for 2030 mean coal and mean carbon prices as determined by the lattice analysis.
UK Coal Proposed Stations and Future FGD and/or CCS Costs
Status as of January 2007 New Plant FGD only New Plant FGD and CCS
Table 11 UK Existing and Proposed Power Plant Year 2030 COE and Emissions (Jess, 2006) 
FGD and FGD/CCS Scenarios 
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Table 12 DTI CO2 Emissions Assumptions  
Typical 500 MW Electricity Generation Plant 
Yearly Emissions 
Plant Type 
Carbon 
Emissions 
(Mtonnes/yr) 
CO2 
Emissions 
(Mtonnes/yr) 
Conventional Coal 0.9 3.300 
Efficient Coal 0.715 2.622 
Efficient Coal w/ Biomass 0.625 2.292 
Efficient Coal w/ CCS 0.1 0.367 
Natural Gas 0.36 1.320 
Natual Gas  w/CCS 0.1 0.367 
Source: DTI, 2006     
   
The analysis considers future carbon and coal prices to determine the best path 
of investment for coal plant owners, as well as the best policy approach to coal.  The 
findings are clear that without future CCS technology, coal energy production alone 
would generate over 1/3 of UK target CO2 emissions.  Consequently, future stringent 
carbon regulations are likely.  It is entirely possible to take this same analysis a step 
further and determine how much volatility and at what high prices the UK could handle 
and still have space for coal generation with or without CCS.  Although it is outside the 
purview of this analysis, the findings can be used to demonstrate that the UK and the 
EU have not established enough stringency in carbon emissions policies since they do 
not force plant owners to address carbon emissions now while they are taking care of 
sulfur emissions.  In addition, the weakness of the carbon policies have been 
demonstrated by low EU ETS trading prices.  
4.6 Findings and Recommendations 
 
 Based on the preceding analysis, several findings and recommendations can be 
drawn.  The following list develops some of the most important ones for the UK going 
forward: 
 
1. Clean coal (with CCS) should play a strong role in the UK electricity system; 
however, its role should be diminished compare to Energy Review findings. 
 
2. Pulverized coal power plants should play a strong role in quickly covering load 
demands, such as due to peak loads or renewable intermittency.  
 
3. Boiler power plants exhibit economies of scale characteristics where, as the 
scale of production increases, the production costs per unit decrease.   In 
addition, smaller capital requirements per kW exist as the scale of the production 
increases.  Therefore, a few or several of the proposed supercritical power plant 
owners should meet to discuss partnership on a larger, cheaper plant with CCS 
and other state of the art technology.  It would be cheaper, emit 90% less carbon 
pollution, and be a huge image boost for clean coal. 
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4. The COE for retrofit (assuming original investment paid-off) is either only slightly 
less than or slightly more than a new plant, depending on the scenario.  
Therefore, existing power plant owners that have opted-in, and plan to build in 
stages one (FGD) and two (CCS), should carefully reanalyze their financial 
options before installing FGD technology to: 
 
a. Opt-out and build a new supercritical plant (partner as above), 
 
b. Opt-out and invest in a different sustainable energy solution (community 
and individual renewable generation and microgeneration), or  
c. Opt-in and save investment costs by upgrading all Best Available 
Technology options at the same time, including FGD, CCS, SCR, carbon 
injection, etc. analyzed in this chapter, and co-fired with biomass (or 
waste), which was not analyzed in this thesis. 
 
5. The DTI and EC should work together to reduce carbon price volatility (and 
uncertainty) through strong and rising price signals.  The recent NAP allocations 
may be a good start, but constant monitoring and adjusting of the cap would 
ensure stringencies strong enough to force innovative technology development, 
and to send strong price signals. 
 
6. The DTI should set strong stringency to support clean coal innovation rather than 
investing in old technology that will be around for another 30 years.  This would 
include direct clean coal carbon technology and sustainable energy subsidies, 
R&D support, feed-in tariffs, stricter quota obligations, removing energy 
innovation barriers, and energy tax exemptions.1 
 
7. The UK needs to drop “NEEC” (Not Entailing Excessive Cost) from Best 
Available Technology standards to force technology innovation and create a 
dynamic market.   
 
8. A 2005 real options analysis determined the optimal carbon price to induce CCS 
implementation.  Based on the coal price of $35.00 per ton (£16.5 per tonne), 
although higher than today, a price of $17.50 per ton of CO2 (£8.2 per tonne) 
would induce carbon technology installation by power plant owners.  A higher 
carbon tax of $25.00 per ton (£11.8 per tonne) of CO2 would induce CCS even if 
coal costs fall to lows of $19.21 per ton (£9 per tonne) (Donnelly, 2005). Since 
carbon prices and coal prices are related, and lately have fallen below levels 
necessary to induce CCS, the EU should seriously reconsider NAPs to induce 
CCS.  Inadequate stringency levels will send the wrong signals and cost 
operators millions of pounds for technology that will soon be outdated and 
insufficient.    
 
                                            
1 For instance, MIT’s co-generation plant supported an algae farm that captured carbon and grew biofuel; 
the same technology is currently being tested in Arizona.  Although the information is proprietary, the 
simple and clean technology is showing early promise.  Engineers are working to handle issues of scaling 
up the technology to handle larger power plants.   
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9. Clean coal is only one piece of the solution and the UK should consider how 
some of the planned coal investments can be better spent on renewable and 
microgeneration technologies.   
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
The modeling efforts used in this chapter are somewhat limited by their simplicity.  
Accuracy is limited by the assumptions of volatility and standard deviation, which are 
based on limited data.  However, comparing the results and findings with previous DTI 
and DTI-sponsored studies found that the process and results could be used to develop 
accurate coal system strategic plans.  Despite the simplicity applied here, the binomial 
lattice analysis has some advantages over past modeling techniques since it considers 
coal and carbon price uncertainties and probabilities of each possible price in future 
years.  In addition, all simple spreadsheet modeling inputs have been determined by the 
IECM program.  It is difficult to determine how accurate these calculations are since 
many are automatically calculated by the computer program behind the scenes.  For 
instance, the carbon dioxide emissions are higher than DTI computed values, which 
means that the DTI may want to reanalyze current calculations in case IECM values are 
more accurate.  Overall, despite the simplicity of the some of the modeling techniques, 
the results are deemed to be an accurate representation of 2030 COE ranges for the 
scenarios.   
 
The flexible approach to design is recommended for analyzing physical projects, 
such as coal power plants, where financial characteristics can be applied to the 
variables.  Valuing the option of closing the plant is also an important tool to determine 
the negative impacts of uncertainties, such as coal and carbon prices in this case.  If the 
analysis shows negative impacts in the event of extremely high coal prices, it is possible 
to close the plant and take less loss on the overall plant costs.  It is also possible to 
operate the plant up to the LCPD limitations and invest the capital into substitute 
sustainable energy projects.   
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) goal to reduce CO2 emissions to 60 percent below 
1990 levels by 2060 is an ambitious goal.  It is a finding of this thesis that existing UK 
energy policies promote incremental steps, which will not create the necessary energy 
transition.  Instead, it will encourage plant owners to retrofit with FGD technology now, 
and later to deal with the carbon emissions issues.  The literature review strongly 
indicates that current UK energy policy is not strategic and stringent enough to send 
strong price signals to force technology innovation or to push the necessary changes in 
the energy system.  In addition, current UK energy policies rely heavily on the electricity 
sector to reduce CO2 emissions. It is a finding of this thesis that UK policy should 
achieve reductions from every sector, and be broad enough to include energy efficiency 
and demand response policies.  However, given existing policy direction that directs 
attention at the electricity segment, this thesis focuses on the largest electricity polluter, 
coal, with some consideration of overall energy systems impacts.  The focus is on the 
immediately pressing issue of UK sustainable coal policy.   
 
Given existing policy direction, this thesis focuses on the largest electricity 
polluter:  coal, with consideration of overall energy systems impacts.  The focus is on 
the immediately pressing issue of UK sustainable coal policy.  Coal is a relatively 
abundant, yet dirty fossil fuel.  In the EU, regulation will require desulfurization 
technology on all existing coal plants by 2016, representing a large capital expenditure.  
In addition, the 2005 start of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme assigns a 
price to carbon, most likely requiring future carbon abatement technologies for coal 
plants.  In fact, several proposed UK coal generators are currently considering Carbon 
Capture and Sequestration (CCS) technology.  For these reasons, the future price of 
coal generation remains largely unknown.  This thesis uses real options analysis to 
create low, medium, and high coal and carbon prices in the year 2030 to account for 
identified future uncertainties.  These scenarios are compared against current and 
proposed coal and carbon policies to determine scenario paths, which can be modified 
as factors change.  The UK has a unique opportunity to take advantage of ageing and 
retiring power plants to transform the existing electricity generation system into a clean, 
robust, secure, and diverse system.     
 
The most pressing issue for the coal industry is how to invest now (by 2008) to 
meet future environmental regulations in a cost-efficient manner, while also considering 
the dynamic and uncertain future of coal.  The modeling results show that, in current 
times of relatively low coal and carbon prices, plants can be run economically without 
CCS.  However, without CCS and when 2030 coal and carbon prices are modeled, 
electricity-generating costs either become very volatile or are simply high.  In addition, 
retrofitting existing plants (even assuming the original capital costs are paid off) is 
almost as expensive to generate electricity (and in high price scenarios slightly more 
expensive) than a new plant.  This indicates that power plant owners should carefully 
consider whether FGD retrofit is cost effective for their plant.           
 
The major conclusion of the analysis is that when accounting for high carbon and 
fuel price uncertainties, it is cheaper to build a new supercritical plant than to retrofit an 
existing plant with FGD and/or CCS.  This is especially true for older plants and if the 
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FGD and CCS will be built in stages.  In addition, although not analyzed in this thesis, 
several technologies—renewable, microgeneration, new nuclear—are cost competitive 
now with new coal power plant cost of electricity.   The UK should review CO2 policy 
across all sectors to ensure strong price signals to induce investment in carbon 
abatement technology across all energy sectors now.  The current policy path will be 
more expensive for the UK, especially since later CCS upgrades will most likely be 
necessary.   
 
Another major finding is that if CCS is not installed in coal plants, it is highly 
unlikely that the UK can meet future carbon targets.  The timing is right for immediate 
policymaker and investor reaction because two-thirds of existing UK coal plants have 
plans for immediate-term FGD-retrofit.  Instead, stringent UK policy would induce these 
plant owners to invest in supercritical, clean technology now in the most long-term cost-
effective manner to achieve future energy policy goals.  It would also avoid investments 
in stand-alone FGD-retrofits, a cost-inefficient way to invest in cleaning up plant 
emissions, and should encourage these plant owners to invest in other, more 
sustainable technologies and policies, with the focus on distributed generation 
renewables and energy efficiency.  This means that UK policymakers should support 
stringent coal policy now to send strong price signals to invest immediately in new clean 
coal infrastructure and/or other renewable technologies rather than face a costly further 
delay of energy system investment.   
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Appendix A—Binomial Lattice Calculation Process 
 
Table 13 Outcome Lattice Calculation Process 
0 Years 
(P0) 1 Years (P1) 
2 Years 
(P2) 
3 Years 
(P3) 
4 Years 
(P4) 
25 Years 
(P25) Step 
 Starting Price = P0 P11 = P0*up  P21 =  P11*up  P31 = P21*up  P41 = P31*up  P251 =  P41*up  25 
  P12 =  P0*down  
P22 = P11*down   
 + P12*up  
P32 = P21*down  
 + P22*up  
P42 = P31*down  
 + P32*up  
P252 = P241*down  
 + P242*up  24 
    P23 = P12*down  
P33 = P22*down  
 + P23*up  
P43 = P32*down  
 + P33*up  
P253 =  P242*down  
 + P243*up  23 
      P34 = P23*down  
P44 = P33*down 
 + P34*up  
P254 = P243*down  
 + P44*up  22 
        P45 = P34*down 
P255 =  P44*down  
 + P45*up  21 
          P256 = P245*down 20 
     … … 
     P2526 = P2425*down 0 
 
Table 14 Lattice Node Probability Calculation Process 
3 1 Year (p1) 
2 Years 
(P2) 
3 Years 
(p3) 
4 Years 
(p4) 
25 Years 
(p25) Step 
 Starting prob = p0 p11 = p0*p  P21 = p11*p  p31 = p21*p  p41 = p31*p  p51 = p41*p  25 
  p12 = p0*(1-p)  
P22 = p11*(1-p)   
 + p12*p  
p32 = p21*(1-p)  
 + p22*p  
p42 = p31*(1-p)  
 + p32*p  
p52 = p41*(1-p)  
 + p42*p  24 
    p23 = p12*(1-p)  
p33 = p22*(1-p)  
 + p23*p  
p43 = p32*(1-p)  
 + p33*p  
p53 = p42*(1-p)  
 + p43*p  23 
      p34 = p23*(1-p)  
p44 = p33*(1-p) 
 + p34*p  
p54 = p43*(1-p)  
 + p44*p  22 
        p45 = p34*(1-p) 
p55 = p44*(1-p)  
 + p45*p  21 
          
p56 = p35*(1-p) 
+ p46*p 20 
     … … 
     p526 =  p425*(1-p) 0 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 21 22
23 
(Year 2030)
24 25 Step
4.55£        6.04£   8.04£   10.69£    14.21£ 18.90£    78.59£   326.76£     1,358.63£  1,806.65£  2,402.41£  3,194.64£  4,248.11£  5,648.98£      25
3.42£   4.55£   6.04£      8.04£   10.69£    44.44£   184.79£     768.34£    1,021.71£  1,358.63£  1,806.65£  2,402.41£  3,194.64£      24
2.57£   3.42£      4.55£   6.04£      25.13£   104.50£     434.51£    577.80£    768.34£    1,021.71£  1,358.63£  1,806.65£      23
1.93£      2.57£   3.42£      14.21£   59.10£       245.73£    326.76£    434.51£    577.80£    768.34£    1,021.71£      22
1.45£   1.93£      8.04£     33.42£       138.97£    184.79£    245.73£    326.76£    434.51£    577.80£         21
1.09£      4.55£     18.90£       78.59£      104.50£    138.97£    184.79£    245.73£    326.76£         20
2.57£     10.69£       44.44£      59.10£      78.59£      104.50£    138.97£    184.79£         19
1.45£     6.04£         25.13£      33.42£      44.44£      59.10£      78.59£      104.50£         18
0.82£     3.42£         14.21£      18.90£      25.13£      33.42£      44.44£      59.10£           17
0.46£     1.93£         8.04£        10.69£      14.21£      18.90£      25.13£      33.42£           16
0.26£     1.09£         4.55£        6.04£        8.04£        10.69£      14.21£      18.90£           15
0.62£         2.57£        3.42£        4.55£        6.04£        8.04£        10.69£           14
0.35£         1.45£        1.93£        2.57£        3.42£        4.55£        6.04£             13
0.20£         0.82£        1.09£        1.45£        1.93£        2.57£        3.42£             12
0.11£         0.46£        0.62£        0.82£        1.09£        1.45£        1.93£             11
0.06£         0.26£        0.35£        0.46£        0.62£        0.82£        1.09£             10
0.15£        0.20£        0.26£        0.35£        0.46£        0.62£             9
0.08£        0.11£        0.15£        0.20£        0.26£        0.35£             8
0.05£        0.06£        0.08£        0.11£        0.15£        0.20£             7
0.03£        0.04£        0.05£        0.06£        0.08£        0.11£             6
0.02£        0.02£        0.03£        0.04£        0.05£        0.06£             5
0.01£        0.02£        0.02£        0.03£        0.04£             4
0.01£        0.01£        0.02£        0.02£             3
0.01£        0.01£        0.01£             2
0.00£        0.01£             1
0.00£             0
Table 15 Carbon Price Binomial Lattice 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 21 22
23 
(Year 2030) 24 25 Step
4.55£        5.30£   6.18£   7.21£      8.41£   9.81£      21.19£   45.74£       115.16£    134.32£    156.67£    182.74£    213.15£         Mean
1.30£        1.51£   1.76£   2.06£      2.40£   2.80£      6.04£     13.03£       32.82£      38.28£      44.65£      52.08£      60.75£           Std Dev
8.43£        9.84£   11.47£ 13.38£    15.61£ 18.20£    39.30£   84.84£       213.63£    249.17£    290.63£    338.99£    395.39£         Max
0.66£        0.77£   0.90£   1.05£      1.22£   1.42£      3.07£     6.63£         16.70£      19.48£      22.72£      26.50£      30.91£           Min
616.08$    per ton Max
48.16$      per ton Min
Exchange Rate 1.92308 Tonne Rate 1.102312 332.12$    per ton Mean
0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 21 22 23 24 25 Step
1.00 0.72 0.51 0.37 0.26 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 25.00
0.28 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.37 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.00 0.00 24.00
0.08 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.019 0.01 0.01 23.00
0.02 0.06 0.12 0.26 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.052 0.04 0.03 22.00
0.01 0.02 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.102 0.09 0.08 21.00
0.00 0.09 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.153 0.14 0.12 20.00
0.03 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.181 0.17 0.16 19.00
0.01 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.174 0.18 0.18 18.00
0.00 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.137 0.15 0.16 17.00
0.00 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.090 0.10 0.12 16.00
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.050 0.06 0.07 15.00
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.023 0.03 0.04 14.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.009 0.01 0.02 13.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.01 12.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.00 11.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 10.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 9.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 8.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 7.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 6.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 5.00
0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 4.00
0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 3.00
0.000 0.00 0.00 2.00
0.00 0.00 1.00
0.00 0.00
Sum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 17 Carbon Probability Binomial Lattice 
Table 16 Carbon Price Summary 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 21 22 23 24 25 Step
27.08£      30.72£    34.84£    39.51£    44.81£    50.82£    95.36£   178.93£  335.73£    380.76£    431.84£    489.76£    555.46£    629.96£    25
23.88£    27.08£    30.72£    34.84£    39.51£    74.13£   139.11£  261.01£    296.03£    335.73£    380.76£    431.84£    489.76£    24
21.06£    23.88£    27.08£    30.72£    57.64£   108.15£  202.93£    230.14£    261.01£    296.03£    335.73£    380.76£    23
18.57£    21.06£    23.88£    44.81£   84.08£   157.76£    178.93£    202.93£    230.14£    261.01£    296.03£    22
16.37£    18.57£    34.84£   65.37£   122.65£    139.11£    157.76£    178.93£    202.93£    230.14£    21
14.43£    27.08£   50.82£   95.36£      108.15£    122.65£    139.11£    157.76£    178.93£    20
21.06£   39.51£   74.13£      84.08£      95.36£      108.15£    122.65£    139.11£    19
16.37£   30.72£   57.64£      65.37£      74.13£      84.08£      95.36£      108.15£    18
12.73£   23.88£   44.81£      50.82£      57.64£      65.37£      74.13£      84.08£      17
9.89£     18.57£   34.84£      39.51£      44.81£      50.82£      57.64£      65.37£      16
7.69£     14.43£   27.08£      30.72£      34.84£      39.51£      44.81£      50.82£      15
11.22£   21.06£      23.88£      27.08£      30.72£      34.84£      39.51£      14
8.72£     16.37£      18.57£      21.06£      23.88£      27.08£      30.72£      13
6.78£     12.73£      14.43£      16.37£      18.57£      21.06£      23.88£      12
5.27£     9.89£        11.22£      12.73£      14.43£      16.37£      18.57£      11
4.10£     7.69£        8.72£        9.89£        11.22£      12.73£      14.43£      10
5.98£        6.78£        7.69£        8.72£        9.89£        11.22£      9
4.65£        5.27£        5.98£        6.78£        7.69£        8.72£        8
3.61£        4.10£        4.65£        5.27£        5.98£        6.78£        7
2.81£        3.19£        3.61£        4.10£        4.65£        5.27£        6
2.18£        2.48£        2.81£        3.19£        3.61£        4.10£        5
1.93£        2.18£        2.48£        2.81£        3.19£        4
1.70£        1.93£        2.18£        2.48£        3
1.50£        1.70£        1.93£        2
1.32£        1.50£        1
1.16£        0
Table 18  Low Sulfur Coal Price Binomial Lattice 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 21 22 23 24 25 Step
1.00 0.68 0.47 0.32 0.22 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25
0.32 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24
0.10 0.21 0.28 0.32 0.21 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 23
0.03 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 22
0.01 0.03 0.22 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 21
0.00 0.12 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 20
0.05 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 19
0.01 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 18
0.00 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 17
0.00 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 16
0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 15
0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 14
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 13
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 12
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 11
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3
0.00 0.00 0.00 2
0.00 0.00 1
0.00 0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2017 2022 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
37.31£      39.33£    41.46£    43.70£    46.06£    48.55£    63.18£   82.21£   106.98£    112.76£    118.86£    125.29£    132.07£    139.21£    Max
16.86£      17.77£    18.73£    19.74£    20.81£    21.94£    28.54£   37.14£   48.33£      50.95£      53.70£      56.60£      59.67£      62.89£      Min
27.08£      28.55£    30.09£    31.72£    33.44£    35.24£    45.86£   59.68£   77.66£      81.85£      86.28£      90.95£      95.87£      101.05£    Median
265.59$    per ton Max
119.99$    per ton Min
192.79$    per ton Median
Table 20 Low Sulfur Coal Probability Binomial Lattice 
Table 19 Low Sulfur Coal Price Summary 
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Table X Medium Sulfur Coal 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 21 22 23 24 25 Step
20.06£      22.62£     25.50£     28.76£    32.42£     36.56£    66.61£     121.37£  221.15£    249.34£    281.13£    316.98£    357.39£    402.96£   25
17.79£     20.06£     22.62£    25.50£     28.76£    52.40£     95.47£   173.96£    196.14£    221.15£    249.34£    281.13£    316.98£   24
15.78£     17.79£    20.06£     22.62£    41.22£     75.10£   136.84£    154.29£    173.96£    196.14£    221.15£    249.34£   23
14.00£    15.78£     17.79£    32.42£     59.08£   107.64£    121.37£    136.84£    154.29£    173.96£    196.14£   22
12.41£     14.00£    25.50£     46.47£   84.68£      95.47£      107.64£    121.37£    136.84£    154.29£   21
11.01£    20.06£     36.56£   66.61£      75.10£      84.68£      95.47£      107.64£    121.37£   20
15.78£     28.76£   52.40£      59.08£      66.61£      75.10£      84.68£      95.47£     19
12.41£     22.62£   41.22£      46.47£      52.40£      59.08£      66.61£      75.10£     18
9.77£       17.79£   32.42£      36.56£      41.22£      46.47£      52.40£      59.08£     17
7.68£       14.00£   25.50£      28.76£      32.42£      36.56£      41.22£      46.47£     16
6.04£       11.01£   20.06£      22.62£      25.50£      28.76£      32.42£      36.56£     15
8.66£     15.78£      17.79£      20.06£      22.62£      25.50£      28.76£     14
6.81£     12.41£      14.00£      15.78£      17.79£      20.06£      22.62£     13
5.36£     9.77£        11.01£      12.41£      14.00£      15.78£      17.79£     12
4.22£     7.68£        8.66£        9.77£        11.01£      12.41£      14.00£     11
3.32£     6.04£        6.81£        7.68£        8.66£        9.77£        11.01£     10
4.75£        5.36£        6.04£        6.81£        7.68£        8.66£       9
3.74£        4.22£        4.75£        5.36£        6.04£        6.81£       8
2.94£        3.32£        3.74£        4.22£        4.75£        5.36£       7
2.31£        2.61£        2.94£        3.32£        3.74£        4.22£       6
1.82£        2.05£        2.31£        2.61£        2.94£        3.32£       5
1.61£        1.82£        2.05£        2.31£        2.61£       4
1.43£        1.61£        1.82£        2.05£       3
1.27£        1.43£        1.61£       2
1.13£        1.27£       1
1.00£       0
le 21 Medium Sulfur Coal Price Binomial Lattice 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 21 22 23 24 25 Step
1.00 0.61 0.37 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25
0.39 0.48 0.44 0.36 0.27 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24
0.15 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23
0.06 0.14 0.22 0.22 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 22
0.02 0.07 0.25 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 21
0.01 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 20
0.10 0.21 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.05 19
0.04 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 18
0.01 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.13 17
0.00 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 16
0.00 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 15
0.01 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.14 14
0.00 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 13
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 12
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 11
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 10
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 9
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3
0.00 0.00 0.00 2
0.00 0.00 1
0.00 0.00
Table 22 Medium Sulfur Coal Probability Binomial Lattice 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2017 2022 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
27.28£      28.21£     29.17£     30.16£    31.19£     32.24£    38.11£     45.04£   53.22£      55.03£      56.90£      58.83£      60.83£      62.90£     Max
12.84£      13.28£     13.73£     14.19£    14.68£     15.17£    17.93£     21.19£   25.05£      25.90£      26.78£      27.69£      28.63£      29.60£     Min
20.06£      20.74£     21.45£     22.18£    22.93£     23.71£    28.02£     33.11£   39.13£      40.46£      41.84£      43.26£      44.73£      46.25£     Median
124.72$    per ton Max
58.69$      per ton Min
91.70$      per ton Median
Table 23 Medium Sulfur Coal Price Summary 
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Appendix B—IECM Model Inputs and Outputs Selected Screenshots 
 
Scenario 1—Low Sulfur Coal, Low Price, Low Carbon Price 
 
Overall Plant Set Up and Diagram (FGD/No CCS) 
 
 
Plant Performance Inputs—Capacity Factors, Gross Electrical Output 
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Plant Performance Inputs—Financing Variables 
 
 
Plant Performance Inputs—O&M Cost Inputs  
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Plant Performance Inputs—Fuel Parameters 
 
 
Plant Performance Inputs—Carbon Dioxide Taxes 
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Plant Performance Inputs—Capital Costs 
 
 
Plant Performance Inputs—O&M Costs 
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Example IECM Power Plant Calculation Results 
 
Overall Plant Performance 
 
 
Stack Contents 
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Annual Levelized Plant Fixed and Variable Costs 
 
 
Annual Levelized Plant Fixed and Variable Costs 
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Appendix C—Example Spreadsheet Calculations from Model Output 
 
In the two tables below, total levelized capital and O&M costs (shown in bold) are calculated from the IECM iteration outputs 
(shown in italics).   
Plant Parameter Value Plant Energy Requirements Value 
Net Electrical Output (MW) 459.8 Gross Electrical Output (MWg) 500 
Primary Fuel Energy Input (MBtu/hr) 3622 Boiler Use (MW) 29.25 
Total Plant Energy Input (MBtu/hr) 3622 In-Furnace NOx Use (MW) 5.00E-02 
Gross Plant Heat Rate, HHV (Btu/kWh) 7243 Hot-Side SCR Use (MW) 2.158 
Net Plant Heat Rate, HHV (Btu/kWh) 7876 Cold-Side ESP Use (MW) 0.9125 
Annual Operating Hours (hours) 6575 Wet FGD Use (MW) 7.754 
Annual Power Generation (BkWh/yr) 3.023 Activated Carbon Inj. Use (MW) 4.75E-02 
Net Plant Efficiency, HHV (%) 43% Net Electrical Output (MW) 459.8 
 Scenario 4 Example Calculation 
500 MW New Supercritical Boiler Plant  
FGD, No CCS, Med S, Low Coal Price, Medium Carbon Price 
Technology 
Capital 
Required 
($/kW-net) 
Capital 
Required 
(£/kW) 
Revenue 
Required 
($/MWh) 
Total 
Levelized 
Cost 
(£/kWh) 
Fixed 
O&M 
(M$/yr) 
Variable 
O&M 
(M$/yr) 
Total 
O&M 
(M$/yr) 
Total 
O&M 
Cost 
(£/kWh) 
Annua-
lized 
Capital 
(M$/yr) 
Total 
Levelized 
Annual 
Cost 
(M$/yr) 
Total 
Levelized 
Cost 
(£/kW) 
Combustion NOx Control 
 $         
32.70   £   17.00   $      1.71  
 £     
0.0009   $   0.23  $     2.82  $      3.05  £  0.0005  $     2.11  
 $         
5.16   £ 0.0014  
Post-Combustion NOx 
Control 
 $         
41.36   £   21.51   $      1.56  
 £     
0.0008   $   0.50  $     1.54  $      2.05  £  0.0004  $     2.67  
 $         
4.72   £ 0.0012  
Mercury Control 
 $           
0.15   £      0.08   $      0.03  
 £     
0.0000   $   0.07  $     0.02  $      0.08  £  0.0000  $     0.01  
 $         
0.09   £ 0.0000  
TSP Control 
 $         
39.87   £   20.73   $      1.42  
 £     
0.0007   $   0.71  $     1.01  $      1.72  £  0.0003  $     2.57  
 $         
4.29   £ 0.0010  
SO2 Control  $      135.20  £   70.30   $      6.18  
 £     
0.0032   $   5.35  $     4.59  $      9.95  £  0.0017  $     8.72  
 $       
18.67   £ 0.0049  
CO2 Capture  $                -     £          -    $           -     £              -     $       -    $          -    $           -     £            -     $          -     $              -     £          -    
Subtotal  $      249.30  £ 129.64   $    10.89  
 £     
0.0057   $   6.86  $     9.98  $    16.84  £  0.0029  $   16.09  
 $       
32.93   £ 0.0086  
Base Plant  $   1,248.00  £ 648.96   $    48.98  
 £     
0.0255   $15.90   $   51.67   $    67.57  £  0.0116  $   80.50  $    148.10  £ 0.0371  
Emission Taxes  $                -     £          -    $  269.10  
 £     
0.1399   $       -    $ 813.50   $  813.50  £  0.1399  $          -     $    813.50  £ 0.2799  
Total  $   1,497.00  £ 778.44   $  329.00  
 £     
0.1711   $22.76   $ 875.20   $  897.90  £  0.1545  $   96.59  $    994.50  £ 0.3255  
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